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 FOREWORD
T. S. Davidson, Q.C.,
President, Mental Health Tribunal,
and Member of the Advisory
Committee of the Institute of
Criminology.
The Mental Health Act 1983, and related provisions of the Crimes (Mental
Disorder) Amendment Act 1983, represent the end results of a process of debate
and discussion which has continued for over eleven years, including two
seminars conducted by this Institute.l
For many psychiatrists this legislation represents a further and unwarranted
interference into matters which they regard as being essentially of medical
concern; for some lawyers it represents a long overdue statutory recognition of
the rights of the mentally ill to be free of the risk of involuntary incarceration
and non-consensual treatment for mental illness except in circumstances
rigorously deﬁned and limited by considerations of necessity in the public
interest.
Although the selection of two psychiatrists and two lawyers to present the
major contributions to this seminar seems to emphasize and reﬂect this apparent
polarisation of concerns, it is really an oversimpliﬁcation of a complex set of
problems involving many contentious issues. Nevertheless, although this polarity
exists only at a superﬁcial level, it serves to provide a convenient framework
for debating the issues dealt with in the legislation.
The provisions of the Crimes (Mental Disorder) Amendment Act 1983, and
Part VII of the Mental Health Act 1983, dealing with the defence of insanity
and the question of ﬁtness to be tried, address problems which are'only to a
very limited extent the direct concern of psychiatrists. On the other hand, these
problems have much to do with the failure of the legal profession and the
bureaucracy to stimulate earlier effective reform in areas of the common law.
We should not have tolerated for so long, and with such apparent equanimity,
the fact that persons acquitted on the ground of mental ill health were
incarcerated without provision being made for formal automatic and periodic
review of their cases with a view to release if this would not be contrary to the
public interest. Nor should we have accepted for so long the fact that persons
unﬁt to be tried should have been incarcerated indeﬁnitely, sometimes'for
periods longer'that the maximum possible sentence which might have been
imposed after a conviction. It remains to be seen, as Mr Harrison’s paper
suggests, whether the introduction of automatic periodic review and of the
“special hearing” and the “limiting term” will provide a satisfactory redress,
but at least the initiative has been taken. -
' Syd. lnst. Crim. Proc. No. 22, Proposed Amendments to the NS. W. Mental Health Act 1958
(N.S.W. Govt. Printer, 1975); Syd. Inst. Crim. Proc. No. 34, Rights ofthe Mentally Ill: Representing
Patients at Mental Health Act Hearings (N.S.W. Govt. Printer, 1978). See also Syd. lnst. Crim.
Proc. No. I, Fitness to Plead (N.S.W. Govt. Printer, 1967). -
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The approach which the mental health advocate takes in representing a
patient whose capacity to give instructions may be in question in the
proceedings, seems to raise problems essentially for the lawyer and, in
particular, whether he should invariably adopt the “strict instructions” approach
or whether on occasions it is proper for him to adopt the “best interests of the
patient” approach. Some psychiatrists, however, from time to time, express
anxiety, and occasionally even resentment, at the intrusion of the advocate. The
prospect of a psychiatric opinion being challenged and being tested in cross-
examination by one who is not likely to be qualiﬁed by training or experience
to do so, and canvassing, in the presence of the patient, matters which may
tend to undermine conﬁdence in the psychiatric advisor, are matters commonly
raised. Suggestions are made that the psychiatrist who gives evidence before a
magistrate or a Mental Health Review Tribunal should be represented in order
to counter the overzealous approach of the patient’s advocate eager to get to
the bottom line in a ﬁeld, as much art as science, in which certainty may be
unachieveable. This in turn raises the question whether proceedings of this sort
should be essentially adversarial or inquisitorial in nature. Mr. Wallach in his
paper stresses the necessity of providing patients with legal representation, not
only for the purpose of protecting their rights, but also for the purpose of
exposing mistakes and maladministration in the institutions in which the
mentally ill are incarcerated. Whilst this may not entirely placate psychiatric
concern there are few, it is submitted, who would disagree with these objectives.
The legislation seeks to reconcile the public interest in maximising freedom
of citizens, even if mentally ill, with that of ensuring safety from physical harm
of the mentally ill and of other members of the community by limiting the
category of persons who may be involuntarily detained as such to those who
are “mentally ill persons” as that term is closely deﬁned in the Act. Each sub-
category of “mentally ill person” must, as so deﬁned, be suffering from a
“mental illness”, but that term is not itself deﬁned. Nor has it been deﬁned in
the predecessors to the 1983 Act. What is “mental illness” is a matter of vital
concern to all psychiatrists—even, presumably, to those who assert that mental
illness does not exist. Psychiatric deﬁnitions of “mental illness”, however, tend
naturally to leave out of account non-medical considerations of the broad public
interest and lack the necessary qualiﬁcations which legislators and lawyers,
especially judges, insist should exist so as to ensure that people who do not want
to be treated, and who are not dangerous to themselves or others, are not
involuntarily detained for that purpose. The term “mental illness”, therefore,
has had to be redeﬁned by the courts, and has become a legal rather than a
medical term. As such it may be too narrowly deﬁned for psychiatric purposes.
In any event the deﬁnition of what is essentially a medical term by the courts
is of questionable necessity now that we have the close deﬁnition of “mentally
ill person” in the Act, giving expression to those matters of public interest which
the Legislature is of the view ought to limit the liability of citizens to
compulsory detention and treatment because they are “mentally ill”.
Nevertheless, Dr Shea in his paper opts for what he describes as a pragmatic
approach, in lieu of the existing statutory deﬁnition. This involves the
formulation of a list compiled by a committee of psychiatrists, lawyers, etc. of
what are commonly agreed to be mental illnesses, with deﬁnitions of each to
be either adopted in the legislation or simply circulated as a statement of
departmental policy. The deﬁnition of “mental illness” is likely to be of central
importance in determining how the 1983 legislation will operate and Dr Shea’s
paper, as well as Dr Durham’s contribution, will help to stimulate further debate
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on a matter which is unlikely to be regarded as put at rest by the statutory
deﬁnition. '
Both as a general‘notion in the context of recommendations by the Mental
Health Review Tribunal as to “forensic patients”, and in particular forms of it
appearing as part of the limiting requirements for a “mentally ill person”, the
issue of “dangerousness” is of basic concern. Again this issue involves a number
of areas of controversy, one of which is whether the mentally ill are any more
prone to have this potentiality than others. Assuming that some persons
suffering from mental illness are prone to be dangerous, the question then arises
' how this potentiality is to be assessed and on the baSis of what sort of evidence.
Dr Sainsbury, in discussing these issues, gives a characteristically frank “no”
to the proposition whether, in general and without any special experience in
the matter, psychiatrists are any better equipped than any others may be to
assess the matter and give expert evidence on the issue. However this may be,
lawyers are inﬁnitely less well-placed and I, for one, am happy to look to the
assistance of Dr Sainsbury and his colleagues on this all important issue.
It is impossible to deal in a foreword such as this with all of the
contributions made to the debate and discussion beyond acknowledging them
and extending my thanks and those of the Institute to all those who made them.
The object of a seminar such as this is to provide a platform for the canvassing
of available points of view, for the promotion of discussion and for the
identiﬁcation of salient issues. I trust that at least in these respects the seminar
.was a success. ‘
 FORENSIC PATIENTS 1986
FOR BETTER OR WORSE
N A Harrison, B..,A LL..,B
Deputy Solicitor for
Public Prosecutions for N.S.W.
The aim of this paper is to examine brieﬂy problems which have
been identiﬁed1n the operations of the Mental Health Act (1958) and
to consider how these problems have been addressed in the Mental
Health Act (1983) and the Crimes (Mental Disorder) Act 1983. This
examination concentrates on persons alleged/found unﬁt to be tried
and how these persons will fare as a consequence of the innovations
of the “special hearing” and the “limiting term”.
Background
The principle that persons who are of unsound mind should not be subject
to the full force and effect of the criminal process is a principle embodied in
the agreed concepts of fair play and justice.
An accused must be capable of defending himself, that is making a full
answer and defence to the charge/s being laid. He must be able to understand
the nature or object of the proceedings against him; for example, does he know
what he has been charged with and what the consequences of a conviction will
be, does he know the purposes of the trial and the roles of the various personnel
in the courtroom, does he appreciate what pleas are available to him and the
consequences thereof, is he able to instruct counsel or to defend himself. '
In Hale’s Pleas of the Crown2 the principle was stated as follows:
If a man in his sound memorycommits a capital offence and
before his arraignment becomes absolutely mad, he ought not by law
to be arraigned during such his phrensy, but be remitted to prison
until that capacity be removed, the reason is because he cannot
advised/y plead t0 the indictment .(my emphasis)
As Lord Reading stated in Regina v. Lee Kun3 the accused’s presence in
the courtroom must be mental as well as physical.
The legislative provisions which have applied in this State since 1958 in
relation to persons alleged to be unﬁt to plead or mentally ill at the time of the,
offence are embodied in the Mental Health Act (1958), as amended (“the 1958
Act”) particularly ss. 23, 24 and 26. It is not necessary to set out these
provisions in full other than to note that s. 23 sets out a procedure where
persons charged with offences are found to be mentally ill by a jury or acquitted
on the ground of being mentally ill; 5. 24 deals with persons certiﬁed as mentally
ill before trial and s. 26 sets out a procedure whereby the Attorney General can
order the removal of a person from a hospital to a prison to facilitate a trial of
the issue of ﬁtness to plead, where such an issue has been raised.
' See for example, R, v. Dashwood (1942) AER p. 586 at 587'.
1 Hale, Pleas oflhe Crown—Vol. I (pp. 34—5).
3(l9l6) 1 KB. 337.
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Despite some amendments to the 1958 Act in 1964, expanding the powers
given to Mental Health Tribunals set up under that Act, a number of
inadequacies within the legislation have been identiﬁed.
The Problems
In 1967 the Institute of Criminology within the Sydney University Law
School organised a seminar on Fitness to Plead.4 In one of the papers presented,
Mr R. P. Roulston, the Senior Lecturer in Law at that Law School, saw the
provisions of Part VII of the Mental Health Act 1958 as appearing to provide
a comprehensive code for the disposition of persons indicted for or convicted
of an offence who are mentally ill or otherwise unﬁt to plead. He nevertheless
raised a number of difﬁculties with the relevant legislative provisions.5
The issues identiﬁed at that time were the proliferation of authorities and
powers under $5. 23, 24 and 26; the machinery by which the Attorney General
could be persuaded to make the appropriate orders under s. 26; and the
inadequate deﬁnition of mental illness.
Other problems have been identiﬁed as follows: .
(a) A person found unﬁt to be tried (formerly referred to generally
as unﬁt to plead) by a jury, might languish indeﬁnitely in custody
until such time as examination proved his/her ﬁtness to be tried.
Having regard to the presumption of innocence, this might well
be regarded as an extreme injustice.
(b) Similarly, a person who had successfully set up a defence of
mental illness under the M’Naghten Rules, and had obtained
from a jury a verdict of “not guilty” on that ground, might
nevertheless be incarcerated for a longer period than if he had
been convicted of the offence with which he was charged.
Furthermore, unless his/her case was kept under regular review
he/shemight be kept in custody for a period which was neither
just nor necessary.
(c) A further problem arose in relation to persons, either on remand
in custody awaiting trial or serving a sentence following upon a
conviction, who had become mentally ill during the period of
incarceration in a prison. Such persons might be transferred
against his/her will from prison to a mental hospital and detained
there for care and treatment.6
In 1972 Dr G. Edwards, the Medical Superintendent ,of Parramatta
Psychiatric Centre was given the task of chairing a Committee of experts to
look at certain parts of the 1958 Act. The Committee consisted of Dr Edwards;
Mr S. Davis from the School of Health Administration, University of New
South Wales; Dr G. Woods, Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of Sydney
Law School; Dr W. Lucas, Senior Lecturer in Forensic Psychiatry at the same
Law School; and Dr P. Houston, Medical Superintendent of the Prison Medical
Service.
4 Syd. Inst. Crim. Proc. No. 1 Fitness to Plead, I967, N.S.W. Government Printer.
5 [bid pp. 84—86.
6 The “Forensic Patients” Provision of the Mental Health Act (1983) and Parts XIA and X13 of the
. Crimes Act, T. S. Davidson, Q.C. President. of the Mental Health Review Tribunal; February 1986.
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The ﬁrst report of the Edwards Committee was produced in 1974. This
was subsequently published as a public document and was the subject of
detailed examination at a seminar held by the Institute of Criminology in 1975.7
Between 1976 and 1982 the original recommendations, which had
commenced as a redrafting of various provisions of the 1958 Act, had been
superceded by the recommendations of an Interdepartmental Committee set up
to sort out differences of approach which existed between the Health
Department and the Attorney General’s Department.
Particularly between 1980 and 1982 the idea of detailed amendments to
the 1958 Act was abondoned in favour of a completely new Act which would
to a large extent repeal the 1958 Act.
The new Act, the Mental Health Act 1983, (“the 1983 Act”) and cognate
Acts, were presented to the Legislative Assembly on 24 November, 1982 by the
then Minister for Health, Mr L. Brereton. The most important of the cognate
Acts was the Crimes (Mental Disorder) Amendment Act, 1983. The Minister
addressed the issues involved in relation to ﬁtness to plead as follows:
It is a well-established and fundamental principle of our criminal
justice system that a person cannot be tried for an offence unless he
is in a condition to defend himself, that is, unless he is ﬁt to plead.
As this concept has developed, it has encompassed all persons who,
for whatever reason, are unable to understand clearly the course and
nature of the proceedings of the trial so as to make as proper defence,
or to challenge a juror or to communicate adequately with a lawyer.
Although the original concept of ﬁtness to plead was developed in
regard to persons who were clearly insane, the .notion of ﬁtness to be
tried has come to be understood as covering all persons who from
whatever cause are unable to plead, understand the proceedings or
communicate with others. In 1936 in the case of Pritchard, Baron
Alderson in addressing the jury in a trial relating to a prisoner who
was deaf and dumb, said:
Upon the issue, therefore if you think that there is no
certain mode of communicating the details of the trial to
the prisoner, so that he can clearly understand them, and
be able properly to make his defence to the charge, you
ought to ﬁnd that he is not of sane mind. It is not enough
that he may have a general capacity of communicating on
ordinary matters.
At present, if an accused person is found unﬁt to plead, the trial
judge, in virtually all cases, will order that the accused be kept in
striCt custody in such place and manner as the judge thinks ﬁt. This
means detention in a mental hospital or prison. The major weakness
in the present system is that a person may be detained indeﬁnitely
without having had an opportunity to present a defence case. In
particular, if a person is mentally retarded, he or she may become ﬁt
in the future so as to come before a court for trial. He or she may
never get out, in effect.
7Syd.1nst.Crim.Proc.No. 22 ProposedAmendments to ther W Mental Health Act(1958) 1975
N. S. W. Government Printer.
 Other deﬁciencies in the existing system can be summarized as
follows: the onus of proof rule in ﬁtness to plead hearings is not clear;
the nature of ﬁtness proceedings is not clear, for example, whether
they are adversary proceedings or not; no procedure exists for
compelling the Crown law authorities to indicate whether it is
~ intended that charges will not be proceeded with against a particular
person, and there is no review by an independent tribunal of the
necessity for continued detention of a person detained as unﬁt.8
The Solutions
The deﬁciencies identiﬁed above are sought to be remedied, insofar as
forensic patients (that is, patients who are unﬁt to be tried or who have been
found not guilty at trial on the grounds of mental illness) are concerned, by the
Crimes (Mental Disorder) Amendment Act and Part VII of the 1983 Mental
Health Act. ~
Whilst the main purpose of this paper is to examine and comment
upon the establishment of the concept of a special hearing and a limiting
term, there is one issue raised which requires comment initially. ‘
The Crimes Act Amendment inserts a new Part XIA in the Crimes Act. It
is a Part entitled “Unﬁtness to be tried for an offence”. It should ﬁrst be noted
that the old concept of “ﬁtness to plead” has been done away with. As can be
seen from the various issues raised earlier in this paper, the question of a
person’s ﬁtness to plead is only a small part of the total concept of a criminal
prosecution of which the Court has to be satisﬁed the person has a proper
understanding. Issues such as challenging the jury, instructing coUnsel,
understanding the evidence are all part and parcel of the understanding required
of a person facing trial. The term “ﬁt to be tried” is now used both in England
and New Zealand.
The Part is divided into two chapters, Chapter I referring to proceedings
in the Supreme or District Courts and Chapter II to other proceedings. In
Chapter II, 5. 428U provides that the Chapter applies to criminal proceedings
in respect of summary offences or indictable offences triable summarily, being
proceedings before a magistrate, but does not' apply to committal proceedings.
When the Edwards Committee approached the question of ﬁtness to be
tried in summary matters, they did so with some difﬁdence. There is clearly an
inconsistency in requiring a jury to try such an issue in the Supreme and District
Court but allowing a magistrate to make a similar order in summary
proceedings. In New Zealand, for example, the use of juries to try issues of
ﬁtness has been abolished and there is therefore no distinction between the
jurisdictions. The Edwards Committee ﬁnally came down in favour of the
retention of juries on the basis that it afforded “some protection which the
public believes ought to be retained”.9
P‘Hansard, Wednesday. 24th November. 1982, pp. 2987—3008.
" Syd. lnst. Crim. Proc. No. 22 supra p. 63.
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Chapter II therefore does not empower the magistrate to make a ﬁnding
on the question of the person’s ﬁtness to be tried but allows the magistrate to
make orders as to that person’s continued detention or otherwise and as to
treatment.
As a consequence, one area which is speciﬁcally excluded from either
Chapter I or Chapter II is that of committal proceedings. It is acknowledged
that a defendant in such an instance is not facing trial. Nevertheless the
consequences of a committal for trial order are not to be ignored. What is a
magistrate to do if, during committal proceedings it becomes apparent that the
defendent may be mentally ill and unable to understand the nature of the
procedings? As Part XIA does not apply, one must assume that the magistrate
has to continue with the committal hearing. How is Part IV of the Justices Act-
to be complied with? Section 36 (3) of the Justices Act grants to a defendant
the right to “make full answer and defence, and . . . give evidence himself,
and . . . examine and cross examine the witnesses giving evidence . . . ”. What
are the consequences for a defendant who is unable, by means of mental illness,
to comply?
By way of example s. 36 (4) requires that the deposition of every witness
shall be recorded. In Mekarzel v The Attorney General for New South Wales'0
Lusher I. ruled that the committal proceedings were rendered void because the
statutory requirements of s. 36 (4) had not been complied with. In R v Cordell
and Parquet" committal proceedings were declared void where the defendants
had been committed for trial after a committal hearing in which they thought
they were represented by a solicitor. In fact the solicitor was appearing amicus
curiae and did not see his role as extending to cross examination of prosecution
witnesses. In delivering judgment EnderbyJ. said in relation to the defendants:
“They did not understand that it meant they would be denied opportunities to
test the evidence led against them. They were also denied the opportunities to
make submissions and call evidence or perhaps to obtain the services of
someone who would do those things for them”.'2
What then, are the consequences for the defendant who is mentally ill at
committal and unrepresented or represented and unable to give proper
instructions? It would appear that the magistrate would commit for trial if “a
prima facie case” is made out. If the prosecution case is uncontroverted through
the lack of involvement of the defendant, the magistrate would be most unlikely
to ﬁnd, under s. 41 (6) that a jury would not be likely to convict the defendant
’ of an indictable offence.
Is the defendant to seek an order quashing the committal, assuming for
the purposes of this argument that he is now in receipt of legal advice, which
he may or may not understand. Should the order of committal be quashed the
defendant remains in limbo. As the offence is indictable the prosecution would
be entitled to lay fresh charges and recommence committal proceedings. What i
if no action is taken?
'0 New South Wales Supreme Court, unreported, 23rd September, 1985. i
" I983 10 A. Crim. R. 475.
'3 ibid p. 480. ’
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~If the defendant is in custody as may well be the case if the defendant is
considered a danger to self or to society, a considerable period of incarceration
may ensue before the proper procedures are implemented.
. Part XIA,.ss. 428A et seq, proceed to determine who may raise an issue of
. unﬁtness to be tried, that is, any party to the proceedings or the Court, and
‘ ﬁxes the burden of proof as being on the balance of probabilities.”
One of the major issues in the old ﬁtness to plead trials is thereby resolved.
Clearly where the evidence was overwhelmingly in favour of or against a ﬁnding
of ﬁtness there was little difﬁculty in practice. However considerable difﬁculties
arose where there was a real conﬂict. In England the matter was partially
resolved by the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v. Podola.” There the Court
held that when the issue was raised by the defence the onus was upon the
defence and was on the balance of probabilities. Where the issue was raised by
the prosecution, then the onus was on the prosecution. Unfortunately the Court
was silent as to the standard of proof in the latter event.
It appears that, in New Zealand, where the trial of the issue of ﬁtness is
reserved to a judge alone, the burden of proving unﬁtness remains on the
prosecution to be established beyond reasonable doubt.'5 ,
As Judge Goran pointed out to this Institute in 1975, since there was “no
question of guilt involved in a trial of ﬁtness, there should be no question of
proof beyond reasonable doubt”.l6
This view is now clearly enshrined.
The Act provides that an inquiry into a person’s ﬁtness shall not be
conducted in an adversary manner.l7 However where there is a real dispute this
rule may be more often broken than not. At present, ﬁtness trials usually involve
each side calling a consultant psychiatrist to give evidence as to the accused’s
mental state. If there is a conﬂict between the two experts, for example, if the
. Crown evidence favours ﬁtness and the defence evidence, assisted by the views
of the instructing solicitor, favours unﬁtness then there will be imparted into
the trial, whether proper or not, a degree of conﬂiCt. An arbitrary rule that the
“inquiry shall not be conducted in an adversary manner” is of no real assistance
to the trial judge, especially when there is no'sanction involved.
It is not my intention to go through all the subsections of s. 428 nor to
refer in detail to the role of the Mental Health Review Tribunal. These are set
out in the second reading speech and more particularly in the pamphlet
produced by the President of the Mental Health Review Tribunal in relation
to “Forensic Patients”.l8 There are however a number of provisions which call
. for particular comment.
'3 s. 4280 Crimes Act.
N(I959) 3 AER 418.
'5 Commentary on R v. Tindall. in I986 10 Crim L]. p. 108.
It’Syd. lnst. Crim. Free. No. 1 (supra) p. 10!.
'7 s. 428H Crimes Act.
"‘ supra footnote 6.
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Section 4285 enables the Attorney General to determine whether an
inquiry should be conducted, before the hearing of the proceedings for the actual
offence, where the question of a person’s ﬁtness to be tried has been raised.
Whilst the Attorney General may determine that an Inquiry not be held,‘9 it
seems that this would only be likely to occur in cases where it appears that the
question has not been raised bona ﬁde.20
Section 428F (5) provides that the court may determine not to hold an
inquiry and may dismiss the charge and order the person’s release where the
court feels it is inappropriate to proceed further, due to the trivial nature of the
charge or offence, the nature of the person’s disability or any other matter which
the court thinks proper to consider. This gives to the court powers which it has
not held in the past and may lead to interesting arguments as to what criteria
the court should apply in deciding whether or not to inquire or dismiss.
Should the Attorney General or the courtdirect that an inquiry be held,
the question of ﬁtness shall be resolved by a jury especially empanelled for that
purpose. 2' Where a person is found ﬁt to be tried the criminal proceedings shall
then continue before anotherJury22 Where a person has been found unﬁt to be
tried after an initial inquiry, the Court must refer that person to the Mental
Health Review Tribunal.23
The Tribunal, as soon as practicable thereafter, has to determine whether
the person, during the ensuing twelve months will be ﬁt to be tried. 2"
Where the determination is that the person will become ﬁt to be tried then
the Tribunal must also determine whether that person is suffering from a mental
illness or a treatable mental condition. The latter distinction is relevant to a
decision as to how the person will be dealt with thereafter, as the court has the
power, on receiving the Tribunal’s decision, to allow bail or order detention in
a hospital or place other than a hospital, which one assumes would include a
prison.25 That person then becomes a forensic patient subject to regular review
under the 1983 Act. Should the Tribunal after further review ﬁnd that the
person has become ﬁt to be tried the Attorney General has to be notiﬁed and
may thereafter request a further inquiry as to the person’s unﬁtness or direct _
no further proceedings.26
The consequences of a ﬁnding by the Tribunal under 5 428K (4) that a
person will not become ﬁt to be tried in the ensuing twelve months and a ﬁnding
by a further inquiry under s. 4285 (1) that a person remains unﬁt to be tried,
are not dissimilar
After a 5. 428K (4) determination, the Attorney General may direct that a
special hearing be held or direct no further proceedings. After a s. 4285 (l)
ﬁnding, the Court shall order a special hearing where the person has been
detained for at least twelve months, and may order such a hearing in any other
case or return the person to custody or hospital.
9 5. 42815 (2) Crimes Act
2" ibid s. 4281: (2)
2‘ [bid s. 4280 (l)
23 ibid s. 4280 (4)
23 ibid s. 4281 (2)
2‘ ibid 5. 428K (I)
15 ibid s. 428L
2" [bid s. 4285 (l)
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As both sections are aimed at ensuring that a person found unﬁt to be tried
is not detained indeﬁnitely in relation to an offence of which he/she may not
be guilty, it is logical to assume that in the majority of such cases the next step
would be the holding of a special hearing.
The Special Hearing
The concept of a special hearing needs to be looked at very carefully. As
the Minister for Health said in the second reading speech:
I am aware that some members of the legal profession may be
a little puzzled by the special Inquiry (sic) notion, involving as it does
a signiﬁcant departure from the principle that a mentally incompetent
person should not be put in jeopardy of criminal punishment. This
is an excellent principal, but in practice it is capable of operating very
unjustly, particularly against mentally retarded persons . . . They may
be locked up forever on a mere accusation. Although the special '
Inquiry (sic) procedure may appear to be somewhat novel, it is
designed to obviate such possible‘injustice . . .27
Let us look then at what is so “novel” about the special hearing. Section
4280 provides that a special hearing shall be conducted as nearly as possible .
as if it were a trial of criminal proceedings. The person shall be legally
represented andthe ﬁnding of unﬁtness is presumed not to be an impediment
to such representation.
The accused person is deemed to have pleaded not guilty; the rights ofjury
challenge may be exercised; the accused person may raise any defence and may
give evidence or make an unsworn statement.28
The jury is to be told that the accused is unﬁt to be tried, what that means,
the purpose of the special hearing, the verdicts that are available and the
consequences thereof.29
Section 4280 (5) is framed on the basis that the following verdicts are open
to the jury: .
(a) not guilty;
(b) not guilty on the ground of mental illness;
(c) that the accused committed the offence, or an alternative offence
charged, on the limited evidence available.
Where the person is found not guilty of the offence charged,‘the person is
entitled to be dealt with thereafter as if there had been an acquittal at a normal
criminal trial.
Where a verdict of not guilty of the grounds of mental illness is returned,
that is deemed to equate to a like verdict at a normal trial. The court is
empowered to act accordingly and make appropriate orders.30
27 Hansard (supra) p. 3006.
13 s. 4280 (3) Crimes Act.
2" ibia'. s. 4280 (4).
39 ibid. See sections 4280 (6) and 428p (5).
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Where the offence (or an alternative) is found to have been committed by
the accused then that ﬁnding constitutes a qualiﬁed ﬁnding of guilt (whatever
that means) but does not constitute a conviction for the offence.“ Nevertheless
such a ﬁnding is essentially a bar to further proceedings, may be appealed
against and enables an application for compensation to be made.
The purpose of the special hearing is stated to be “ensuring,
notwithstanding the unﬁtness of the person to be tried in accordance with the
normal procedures, that the person is acquitted unless it can be proved to the
requisite criminal standard of proof that, on the limited evidence available, the
person committed the offence charged or any other offence available as an
alternative to the offence charged”.32
It will be very interesting to see how the courts and legal practitioners cope
with this “Claytons” trial.
The rationale behind the concept is logical. Once one accepts that it is
unfair to subject a mentally ill patient to a criminal trial the present
consequences are that such a person will be detained indeﬁnitely, with a trial
perhaps permanently withheld. The irony is that this withholding of trial is
justiﬁed on the basis that the person must be treated fairly.
Under the proposed “special hearing” regime, the speciﬁc provisions
mentioned earlier have been implemented in an attempt to assist the person’s
defence. But there are other problems which are not so easily overcome. The
particular mental disability may have lessened if not totally destroyed a person’s
ability to give evidence, to remember what may have happened at the time of
the offence (e.g. an alibi or self defence) or to properly instruct counsel. The
latter will certainly .be the case as this is one of the speciﬁc criteria which will
have been addressed in the earlier ﬁtness to be tried hearing.
Clearly a special hearing is preferable to unlimited detention with the issue
of guilt never addressed beyond the prima facie level which resulted in the
original committal for trial.
However provisions allowing the person to raise any defence and to give
evidence or make an unsworn statement, really go no way to ensuring that the
person receives a fair “special hearing”.
The reference to “limited evidence” clearly contemplates the problem of
the person being unable to give a relevant account of events.
If the defence is simply a question of putting the prosecution to strict proof,
then that can probably be achieved in a special hearing. However in the
majority of normal trials the defence goes beyond that threshold point. The
defence may be an alibi, an assertion of self defence, or of duress or accident,
or a denial of intent, or as occurs in many cases an allegation that the alleged
admissions which point to guilt were either fabricated or induced or both.
3' ibid. s. 4280 (7) (a).
n ibid. s. 428M (2).
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How is 'a mentally incompetent person to raise such issues? While the Act
provides that the person shall be legally represented unless the court otherwise
allows, how is the legal representative to gain instructions? A provision in these
terms: “the fact that the person has been found unﬁt to be tried for an offence
shall be presumed not to be an impediment to the person’s representation”33
' is really meaningless. A presumption that there is no impediment does not
remove the impediment.
If the person is unﬁt to be tried, having failed the tests as to understanding
of the nature of the proceedings and in particular having been shown as unable
to properly instruct his legal representatives, what sort of defence/s can possibly
be raised under s. 4280 (3) (c)? The answer must clearly be—very few. Is the
legal representative to appear, to cross examine witnesses as to their veracity,
to raise defences, without instructions?
An explanation to the jury that the person is “unﬁt to be tried in
accordance with the normal procedures, the meaning of unﬁtness to be tried,
the purpose of the special hearing, the verdicts available and the legal and
practical consequences ofthose verdicts”3415 clearly essential but will it achieve
a fair hearing? Will not juries faced with persons unable to assist their counsel,
and thereby assist thejury, be unlikely to return verdicts of not guilty? Will not
the tendency be for the special verdict of not guilty on the ground of mental
illness be a more attractive alternative, despite. all proper and earnest
exhortations of defence counsel and the trial judge?
It is possible for example that the person may be unﬁt to be tried, sane at
the time of the offence but mentally ill at the time of the trial. Is a jury of lay
persons going to be able to group the' intricacies of such a combination of
factors? How is the trial judge to sum up in such circumstances? In the
hypothetical situation suggested, the various “states of mind” might be legally
distinguishable but will they be factually so? Is it not more often the case than
not that the evidence of the person’s state of mind at the time of the offence is
. in fact not known but only inferred from the various circumstances of the case?
It remains to be seen whether the high ideals behind the special hearing
can be approached let alone reached.
Nevertheless it must be acknowledged that for many persons under
detention as unﬁt to plead, even a qualified ﬁnding of guilt will be an
improvement on the present position. What can now be an indeterminate period
of detention will be replaced by a further innovation.
The Limiting Term
Where a qualiﬁed ﬁnding of guilty is made, the court is required to indicate
if it would have imposed a sentence of imprisonment or penal servitude for the
offence found to have been committed. If the court would have imposed a
sentence then the court shall nominate a term called a “limiting term” being
the best estimate of the head sentence which would have been appropriate if it
had been a normal trial.35 '
n ibia’ s. 4280 (2).
3411m! s. 4280 (4).
3'5 (bid. 5. 428p (1).
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The Tribunal is to be notiﬁed accordingly and to make a determination as
to whether the accused is suffering from a mental illness or a treatable mental
condition.36 The court thereafter is empowered to order the detention of the
accused in a hospital or another place,37 assumedly for the period of the limiting
term. ~
The qualiﬁed ﬁnding of guilt does “not constitute a basis in law for any
conviction for the offence to which the ﬁnding relates”.38 Problems spring to
mind immediately. What if the court would not have ﬁxed a head sentence but
would have deferred sentence? It cannot do so, on my reading of the Act. As
indicated in the hypothetical case suggested earlier, the person at the time of
the “verdict” may be unﬁt to be tried and/or mentally ill. If the person is unﬁt
and no head sentence is appropriate, how is the court to deal with the person?
The Act is silent as to what the court should do in such circumstances.
Surely the person is not to be further disadvantaged by the court having
to ﬁx a limiting term to enable the remaining provisions of s. 428? to be brought
into effect. ’ ~
The consequences of the ﬁxing ofa limiting term would seem to be, as far
as the person is concerned, that the person after referral to the Tribunal can be
detained by court order either in hospital or prison for no longer than the period
of the limiting term. During that period of time the person’s case will be
reviewed regularly by the Tribunal.
Certainly under s. 117 of the 1983 Act the ﬁrst review will be within
fourteen days. The Tribunal’s role at the ﬁrst review is to ascertain if the person
has now become ﬁt to be tried, and whether-the safety of the person or of the
public would be seriously endangered if the person was released. It would seem
unlikely that the person would have become ﬁt .to be tried when a similar review
some short time earlier (a review which led to the special hearing~procedure
being implemented) had answered the same question in the negative.
Nevertheless if the subsequent review by the Tribunal reveals that the
person has become ﬁt to be tried, the Tribunal must notify the Attorney General
.who will presumably then direct that arrangements be made for trial or will
direct no further proceedings.
. One obvious consequence is that the Crown is thereupon put to the
expense and the Crown witnesses are put to the inconvenience, of taking part
in a second “trial” within a short time of an almost identical earlier hearing.
Or is it to be suggested that the Attorney General would exercise his discretion
to direct no further proceedings in a more liberal fashion than at present, on
the basis that the earlier hearing has satisﬁed the rights of the victims as to
compensation and has lead to a qualiﬁed ﬁnding of guilty in relation to the
particular offence.
3“ ibid. 55. 4289 (2) and (3).
’7 ibid. s. 4280.
3" ibid. s. 4280 (7).
 23
Where the Tribunal arrives at a negative conclusion as to ﬁtness but is
satisﬁed that the person may safely be released, the Tribunal is to make such a
recommendation to the Minister for Health who shall notify the Attorney
General accordingly. If the Attorney General does not object within thirty days
of notiﬁcation, the prescribed authority may order the person’s release. The
Attorney General may object on the basis that the person has served insufﬁcient
time in custody or under detention; or because the Attorney General intends
to proceed with criminal charges against the person. In either such case the
- prescribed authority shall not order the person’s release.39
What then, is the effect of the limiting term. Clearly it is not intended to
be binding or even persuasive on the Tribunal as the criteria the Tribunal must
abide by under s. l 17 (3) are clearly set out and the length of the limiting term
is not amongst them. Is the limiting term then to be set as an indication to the
Attorney General when he exercises his mind as to whether to object to the
person’s release? Clearly there the limiting term is of relevance. But how far
must or should the Attorney General be bound by that term? Is the Attorney
General entitled to say, in effect, that the person is not to be released until the
expiry of the whole of the limiting term? Clearly that entitlement exists on a
simple reading of the section.
The limiting term is clearly not intended as in any way setting a minimum
period for detention or otherwise. The rationale is that the limiting term sets
the maximum length of time during which the person may be detained as a
forensic patient.
Consider this however. Under the provisions of the Probation and Parole
Act (1983) every person convicted of an offence and sentenced to a term of
imprisonment is “entitled” to certain speciﬁed remissions upon both the head
sentence and non parole or non probation period.
What then of the forensic patient?
Is the Attorney General entitled, in the exercise of his discretion, to ignore
the effect that remissions'would have had on the limiting term if it had not
been a head sentence after a proper trial? The Act does not address itself to
such an issue, an issue which one might consider vital to the interests of the
person. If the Attorney General says, in effect “you are to be detained for the
full period of the limiting term”, as he is clearly entitled to do, then the person
is at a disadvantage in relation to competent accused who have been tried and
sentenced for like offences and thereafter given the beneﬁt ‘of release by
remissions.
The competent accused who has served a periodin custody prior to
conviction and sentence is also entitled to have that period taken into account,
either by a “reduction” in the head sentence or more appropriately by the
backdating of the head sentence and non parole/non probation period. Is the
presiding judge, in ﬁxing a limiting term, to allow a similar discount when it
comes to setting the “best estimate” of what the head sentence would have
been? '
3" s. I I7 Mental Health Act 1983.
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Likewise how can one justify the power as to release/non release vesting
in the Attorney General when it is effectively in his name that the prosecution
has originally been brought. The idea of the prosecutor also being the arbiter
of the length of “sentence” is a novel concept with far reaching ramiﬁcations.
The Attorney General’s second option is to indicate an intention to proceed
with criminal charges against the person. I fail to comprehend the logic of this
provision. The premise upon which the Attorney General’s views are sought is
that the person is still unﬁt to be tried. On what basis then would the Attorney
be contemplating criminal charges?
Is it that s. 117 (6) (b) contemplates a future event? Is it to enable the
Attorney General to say: “this person may become ﬁt to be tried within the
next six months. He will then be reviewed by the Tribunal. If he is found ﬁt to
be tried, I can then continue the criminal proceedings. I will not allow his
release until I see what happens”?
That would clearly be a proper consideration to take into account. However
a deferral for six months may lead to a further deferral for six months and so
on, if there is a continuing possibility that the person may become ﬁt.
What must not be lost sight of here is that the person has not been found
guilty of any criminal offence. There has been no conviction. The “limiting
term” is not a term of imprisonment. What then is the need for the provisions
in s. 1 l7 (6)? Is it to provide a statutory alternative or substitute for the present
system of release by the Governor on the advice of the Executive Council?
The practical problem facing the Minister and the Attorney General is that
the person may have been subject to a qualiﬁed ﬁnding of guilt in relation to
what may have been a most horriﬁc and therefore sensational offence. The
political consequences of permitting such a person to be released shortly after
a special hearing may well carry weight in the decision which is made under s.
117 (6).
It should be noted that the decision of the Tribunal under s. 117 (3) that
the person is/is not in a condition to be released, can be the subject of an appeal,
by way of rehearing, to the Supreme Court. There is no such right of review in
relation to the Attorney General’s decision under s. 117 (6).
The person detained under a limiting term ceases to be a forensic patient
once the limiting term has expired; upon unconditional release following a
recommendation of the Tribunal; where the release was conditional, upon the
expiry of the conditions; upon the person being classiﬁed by the Tribunal as a
continued treatment patient.“0
The consequences therefore are that the person is likely to have been
released, either conditionally or unconditionally during the course of the
limiting term. Where the person is suffering from such a mental disorder as to
be a danger to self or society then the person, at the completion of the limiting
term, would be reclassiﬁed and a continued treatment patient. Thereafter the
person would come within Part V of the 1983 Act, which relates to the
involuntary admission of person to hospital, and thus outside the scope of this
papen
‘05. 127(1).
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Conclusion
No longer will an accused person be detained indeﬁnitely solely on the
grounds that he/she is unﬁt to be tried and it is therefore improper for the
question of guilt to be addressed.
The innovative alternatives, the special hearing and the limiting term, will
go some way to establishing whether that person should be detained as a
consequence of the offence and, if so, what is the maximum permissable period
of detention. .
Whether these innovations are effective will depend to a large degree on
the good graces of the legal representatives of the Crown and the person. The
provisions in both Acts referred to are complex. A strictly legalistic approach
will not be to the beneﬁt‘of the accused person. Whether another style of
approach is appropriate and, if so, whether it is successful in achieving the
humane considerations which underlie the legislative action undertaken, only
time will tell.
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I should preface my remarks by saying at the outset that whilst this paper
was written by me and my title is Deputy Solicitor for Public Prosecutions, you
would appreciate that the views expressed therein are totally mine. I must admit
to having had some trepidation when I was asked by the Chairman to prepare
a paper for this seminar. It is very difﬁcult to decline when you have a brawny
Scot on the other end of the phone asking you nicely. The following day the
Chairman conﬁrmed that what I was to, speak on was a critical analysis of the
Crimes Mental Disorder (Amendment) Act as well as the forensic patients
provisions of the Mental Health Act and how they interlock. At ﬁrst blush I
thought I would be here for several hours and the paper would probably run to
some hundred pages. What he did do then, which caused me even greater
consternation, was to produce three weeks later a “pamphlet” entitled “The
Forensic Patients Provisions of the Mental Health Act 1983 and Parts XIA and
B of the Crimes Act". In a sense he took the wind from my sails and I ended
up writing a paper concentrating mainly on the innovative parts of the Crimes
Mental Disorder (Amendment) Act, the Inquiry, the Special Hearing, and the
Limiting Term.
1 would like to take up a couple of the issues that I have raised in the~ paper
and elaborate on them.
It can be seen from a detailed examination of both the Acts and from a
reading of my paper there has been little change in the treatment of persons
unﬁt to be tried, insofar as that relates to the proceedings which have to be
followed prior to the inquiry into the person’s ﬁtness. Under the old Mental
Health Act what was called a ﬁtness to plead trial was conducted after a
direction by the Attorney-General under s. 26 (3) of that Act. Under the new
Act a ﬁtness to be tried inquiry can be commenced by order of the Attorney-
General or by order of the court and may be commenced at the instigation of
any party to the proceedings. So there is some slight variation. So far as persons
who are unﬁt to be tried are concerned the essential innovative features of the
new Acts relate to their disposition after ﬁndings of unﬁtness to be tried. The
assessment of such persons and the subsequent reviews are two of the major
roles of the new Tribunal.
Perhaps if I can turn brieﬂy to look at the composition of the Tribunal. It
. consists of members appointed by the Governor and includes a President and
one or more Deputy Presidents. The other members of the Tribunal are to be
barristers or solicitors of at least ﬁve or seven years’ standing respectively, as
well as psychiatrists and persons having other suitable qualiﬁcations or
experience. Both the President and any Deputy President must also be barristers
or solicitors of the stated standing. Except in the case of the President or the
Deputy President both of whom must be appointed full time, members may be
appointed on a part- time basis. They must include one or more women, and
one or more persons of ethnic background. They are not subject to the Public
Service Act and they may be removed only for inability, misbehaviour, or failure
to comply with the terms and conditions of appointment. I am not sure in the
present climate who is going to remove them You might require a special
complaints division.
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What I want to point out to you is you have a Tribunal with very wide
experience. As most of you will realise the two persons appointed as President
and Deputy President are both senior counsel with extensive forensic experience
with particular emphasis on the criminal law.
The Tribunal itself has a wide range of powers not just in relation to
forensic patients with which my paper deals. It has powers under $5. 95 and 97
of the Mental Health Act to determine whether temporary patients are mentally
ill and to make orders for the classiﬁcation and detention of those persons.
Under 5. 102 of the same Act it is empowered to make determinations in
relation to continued treatment patients. Under 5. 428K of the Crimes Act (as
amended) the Tribunal has to determine whether on balance the person referred
to it by the court or trial will become ﬁt during the next twelve months and
certain consequences follow. Under s. 4285 of the Crimes Act, where there has
been an earlier ﬁnding of unﬁtness to be tried, the Tribunal is to form an
opinion as to whether that person is now ﬁt. In such cases the Attomey—General
has to be notiﬁed and the Attorney may then require a further inquiry into the
person’s ﬁtness to be tried or he may direct no further proceedings. Of course,
as you will see from a reading of the Mental Health Act there are provisions
there in relation to appeals from any of the determinations, orders, directions,
or decisions of the Tribunal.
The point I want to make is that you now have established a Tribunal
consisting of persons experienced in the criminal law, in psychiatry, and of
persons who are to reﬂect the community interest in the proper treatment of
persons found unﬁt to be tried or found to be mentally ill. There is clearly a
role, in my view, for this Tribunal to play a far greater part in the disposition
of persons found unﬁt to be tried.
What I would like to suggest for future consideration is that the concept
of a ﬁtness to be tried inquiry being held before a judge and jury should be
looked at most critically. I point out in my paper that in New Zealand the use
of juries to try issues of ﬁtness has been abolished. The Edwards Committee
(see page 13) ﬁnally came down in favour of the retention ofjuries on the basis
that it afforded some protection which the public believed ought to be retained.
In retaining trial by jury of such an issue, that is the issue of whether a person
is ﬁt to be tried, you are relying on twelve lay persons who will almost certainly
have no experience of persons with any sort of mental illness or mental
condition. Such persons will ﬁnd it difﬁcult to give due regard to any cultural
factors which are relevant to the particular accused. The trial judge may not
necessarily have had any particularly relevant experience in the ﬁeld of
psychiatric illness. ‘
Remember also that where a ﬁtness question is raised during the actual
proceedings as s. 4285 (i) allows, then the proceedings, whether they be trial or
sentence, would have to be adjourned in any event to allow fresh jury panels
to be called to sit on the inquiry.
Why should it not be proper I would ask for a person who is suspected of
being unﬁt to be tried to be assessed solely by the Tribunal? In the majority of
cases there is no dispute one way or the other. The decision by the Tribunal
that a person is ﬁt to be tried would allow for the immediate institution of the
normal criminal process without the duplication or delay which is involved in
having a further inquiry before a judge and jury and then a further trial before
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a judge and jury. As I have indicated earlier such a determination by the
Tribunal would be the subject of right to appeal before the Supreme Court in
any event.
Where the Tribunal determined that the person was unﬁt to'be tried then
the Attorney-General could be notiﬁed and a direction given that no further
proceedings be undertaken or that a special hearing be instituted. This would
again allow for streamlining of the process, for a reduction in the delay, and
any such determination by the Tribunal would also be the subject of a right of
appeal. The interpolation of the Tribunal into the proceedings would also help
to cure the deﬁciency I have identiﬁed in my paper where a magistrate is sitting
in committal proceedings.
If the Tribunal is to have such a case referred to it for determination then
a ﬁnding of ﬁtness would allow the magistrate to continue the committal. If the
ﬁnding was of unﬁtness to be tried, as we are now talking about indictable
offences, why should not the Attorney-General again be allowed to direct no
further proceedings or to 'direct that a special hearing be held? The present
consequences of a magistrate continuing with the committal, as I have said, is
that the accused would be committed for trial and eventually after a waste of
a great deal of time a special hearing is still likely to be the end result in any
event.
Why should we not have such determinations which reﬂect in no way on
the accused’s guilt or innocence, determined by a Tribunal speciﬁcally set up
with the expertise to assess such matter? The proceedings set out in the two
Acts are extremely complex as any of you who have tried to read them will
understand. The President in producing his pamphlet has indicated that he has
tried to make it as simple as possible and the end result of the paper ﬂow looks
like a wiring diagram for a space defence system.
What I am suggesting to you is that the Act needs to be looked at. A
number of the papers have indicated that there are problems with the Act as it
. presently stands. As I have said the main aim of the legislation is the protection
of the rights of the mentally ill or those who are unﬁt. Any suggestions which
enable the streamlining of the process should be seriously considered. On that
basis I look forward to hearing discussed ways that purpose may be achieved.
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MENTAL HEALTH ADVOCACY IN NEW SOUTH WALES
I. Wallach,
Solicitor in Charge,
Mental Health Advocacy Service,
Legal Aid Commission, N.S.W.
The ever impending approach of the commencement of the Mental Health
Act 1983 appears to be developing into a legal, psychiatric and administrative
“long march”. Indeed, one could be forgiven for comparing this process with
the 11 year process which was involved in drafting the ﬁnal passage through
Parliament of the Mental Health Act 1983 itself which had its conception in
the establishment of the Edwards Committee in 1972. One unintended side-
eﬂ‘ect of this delay has been a misconception, widespread in some quarters, that
the Mental Health Act 1983 is in effect in some way. There are variations of
this theory, but they all have in common the idea that the new Act is responsible
for an alleged deterioration in the standard of mental health care, especially in
hospitals.
One variation has it that magistrates are in fact applying at hearings the
new deﬁnition of a “a mentally ill person”. This has no foundation in fact
whatsoever, indeed, some magistrates have continued to apply the deﬁnition in
the Mental Health Act 1958 in a very broad fashion, continuing the practice of
making orders in respect of patients suffering from dementia, contrary to the
decision of the Supreme Court in RAP v AEP (1982) 2 NSWLR 508. Another .
variation has it that the new Mental Health Act prevents doctors from making
admissions as they feel necessary, especially in relation to persons with a suicide
risk. Not only is this variation untrue, but it always has been the case and will
continue to be so under the 1983 Act that any person being a signiﬁcant suicide
risk does clearly come within the deﬁnition of “a mentally ill person”. A third
variation has it that the new Act compels the early and, apparently improper
discharge from hospitals of people who are a signiﬁcant suicide risk. As in the
previous example, it has always been the case under the 1958 Act and will
continue to be so under the 1983 Act that patients being a signiﬁcant suicide
risk can be detained as an involuntary patient and may, if necessary be again
presented to a magistrate for committal.
Each of the three examples cited above are important in themselves
because they reveal diﬁiculties in the practice of psychiatry experienced by
doctors and deﬁciencies in their knowledge of the special legal requirements and
regime which apply to their ﬁeld of practice. Unfortunately, it is the case that
there continues to be widespread ignorance amongst doctors in psychiatric
practice of the Mental Health Act 1983, in general, and the deﬁnition of “a
mentally ill person”, the functions and powers of magistrate’s hearings under
the Act and the functions of a patient’s advocate in particular. On occasion,
the media have reported public statements by doctors who have said that
“patient’s interests . . . are really being exploited by the legal system” and that
lawyers “see their responsibility as ending with, as they say, ‘getting them off.”
The same article blamed this state of affairs on a “new system”. (Sydney
Morning Herald 22—5—86). No such “new system” exists at Rozelle Hospital
(the hospital referred to in the article) as legal representation has existed there
since a pilot scheme in 1977 and, as noted above, the Mental Health Act 1958
is still in force, although it is these two things which are often pointed out as
, being the cause of shortcomings in- the system. ‘ '
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By way of comparison, I wish to quote a number of examples involving
people who have been presented to magistrate’s hearings at various hospitals
in Sydney for committal as involuntary patients during the last 12 months. I
make certain observations and comments in relation to each case in order to
highlight what went wrong in each case. I do so because I believe that the
misconceptions, if not disinformation, referred to above indicates that
deﬁciencies in the system of mental health care which brought about the Mental
Health Act 1983 are still present and that their lessons have not yet been learnt.
Indeed, it is important that these cases be brought to light because of the
disinformation surrounding proposals to increase public scrutiny of the mental
health care system, to deinstitutionalise mental health care and to extend legal
representation to all proceedings under the Mental Health Act 1983.
Case 1
A young man in his late 20’s was presented to the magistrate with a request
relayed by the hospital administrative assistant that an order to detain the man
for three months was being sought by the medical superintendent. The man had
been admitted to the hospital under a doctor’s medical certiﬁcate approximately
one week prior to the hearing and had received some treatment and had been
observed during that time. The man spoke noticeably slowly and was also
visibly slow in his actions. At the request of the man’s solicitor and the
subsequent insistence of the magistrate, the treating doctor subsequently
attended the hearing. The doctor stated that he was seeking the order on the
basis of the abovementioned observations and also that the man had been seen
in the ward rolling faeces in his fingers and later masturbating in view of other
patients without apparent inhibition. During cross-examination, the doctor
noted that, after the week’s admission and observation, no diagnosis for his
condition had yet been made. He further stated that in his opinion the patient
was suffering from either some form of psychotic illness or from an organic
condition. such as a tumor. The doctor further stated that he was not concerned
with the two dissimilar diagnoses and pressed his request to the magistrate that
a three month order should be made. The man’s solicitor pressed his client’s
instructions that he be discharged, but accepted that, in view of the man’s
condition, a diagnosis should be made rather than the magistrate concluding
the hearing by ordering the man’s discharge from hospital. Over the strong
objections of the doctor, the magistrate then adjourned the hearing for two
weeks in order to have the hospital carry out investigations to enable a diagnosis
to be made.
This case gives rise to concern for several reasons, the least of which are
that no diagnosis had been made nor had any planned treatment been
formulated. The major ground for concern arising out of this hearing is the fact
that the doctor was quite prepared to request an order detaining the patient for
a period of three months in a psychiatric hospital when he was unable to say
whether or not his patient was suffering from a psychiatric condition or an
organically caused condition. Had it transpired, as tests later indicated, that the
patient’s condition was due to organic causes, it would not have been possible
to treat him at the psychiatric hospital and his condition would have
necessitated his transfer to a general hospital for treatment. In such
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circumstances, I would suggest that an order under the Mental Health Act to
detain the man for treatment and observation would not have served its purpose
as no psychiatric treatment whatsoever would have been provided. I would
further suggest that the man’s attitude in relation to accepting treatment may
well have differred if he had been told the true situation rather than being
compelled to accept labelling as a psychiatric patient. Indeed, there was some
doubt as to exactly how much his treating doctor had told him about his
condition.
Case 2
A women in her early 30’s was presented to a magistrate for committal
and a six-week order to detain her in the hospital was sought. This presentation
was the third time she had been admitted to a hospital in a period of 1 month.
On the ﬁrst occasion, she was admitted as a voluntary patient but discharged
the next day after assessment by her treating doctor. The second admission
occurred some two weeks later when her treating doctor did not seek an order
but requested that an order for her discharge be suspended by fourteen days.
Effectively, that admission was for a period of fourteen days but speciﬁcally
aimed at returning her to the community and meeting her needs in so doing.
No effective community follow-up care was provided. On each admission to the
hospital, although being treated in the same ward, a different treating doctor
was assigned to her. On this occasion she was diagnosed as suffering symptoms
of schizophrenia. This diagnosis was based on incidents at her home in which
she had lit a small ﬁre in a teapot in her room and was seen by her mother
lying on a path outside the house. It was not disputed that she had suffered
from schizophrenia in the past, her only prior admission to hospital occurring
some two years before.
At the hearing, her treating doctor presented her case as one involving the
manifestations of schizophrenic symptoms for which the proper treatment was
by chemotherapy. No reference was made by the treating doctor to this woman’s
background or present circumstances. During the hearing, the doctor did not
attach any signiﬁcance to her social environment or history. In fact, the woman
although in her early 30’s, was still living at home being cared for by her mother
and had not managed to live independently outside her parents’ home for
periods longer than onemonth. In giving instructions to her solicitor, she stated
that her attempts at the independent living, getting job training and employment
had proved to be unsuccessful and that she was worried that future such
attempts would end in failure. Her instructions on this occasion were to consent
to a seven-day adjournment of the hearing whilst she was assessed for
community care under the supervision of the local Crisis and Respite Team.
Such teams include psychiatrists, social workers and psychiatric and community
nurses. Their programs range from psychiatric care to developing social skills.
At the hearing, this course was strenuously opposed by the treating doctor
who based his diagnosis and proposed treatment plan purely on strict
psychiatric criteria without reference to social factors. Evidence was given
during the hearing that in addition to the other social factors referred to above,
during the past month the patient’s father had been dying, ﬁnally passing away
in the days immediately prior to this admission. The evidence drew a picture
of the patient’s mother under extreme stress in caring for her dying husband
and for her difﬁcult and dependent adult daughter. The magistrate adopted the
course proposed by the patient’s solicitor and adjourned the matter for seven
days to allow the assessment by the Crisis and Respite Team to take place.
 
32
In opposing the adjournment, the treating doctor obliquely suggested that
granting an adjournment for such a purpose was a challenge to his professional
status and expertise. At the hearing following the adjournment a more senior
and experienced doctor appeared who stated that the patient had been seen and
assessed by the Crisis and Respite Team as suitable for community care and
that he agreed with this course. The magistrate ordered that she be discharged
from the hospital, suspending the order for seven days. Subsequently, the
woman returned home and commenced attending a living skills centre as a
preparatory step before living independently from her mother.
The course that this particular case took and the result which was achieved
largely speaks for itself. It is an example of the deﬁciencies in adopting a purely
“medical model” approach in psychiatry. Whilst it was not disputed that the
woman did have some psychiatric symptoms the severity of the symptoms was
strongly in question. In addition, the result indicates that social factors were
not seriously considered, if at all, by her treating doctor to the extent that the
doctor did not appear to have either investigated or informed himself of the
severe social strain in the woman’s background. It would also stand as strong
evidence for the proposition that, in appropriate cases, social therapy is as
effective and important in its own right as well as in conjunction with
psychiatric treatment.
These two examples are cited as reminders that reform and change in
psychiatry practice and care in this State are still both necessary and desirable.
They are also reminders that legal factors can act as catalysts in speeding up
the arrival of specialised and differentiated forms of mental health care. It
cannot be denied that hospitalisation may provide only limited assistance at a
considerable social cost to the patient. It is worth bearing in mind, that these
positive steps forward are the result of scrutiny and intervention by members
of non-medical professions and the intervention of outside social processes,
including the law and legal representation.
The need for change also extends to the system of care for and review of
the cases of forensic patients. Forensic patients may be broadly deﬁned as
persons under detention in either Psychiatric Hospitals or prison as a result of
criminal charges or proceedings in a court. At present, the care of forensic
patients is carried out by the Department of Health pursuant to Part VII of the
Mental Health Act, 1958. The relevant ofﬁcers designated with responsibility
under the Act are the medical superintendent and ofﬁcial visitors of each
hospital and the authorised ofﬁcer appointed pursuant to the Act.
As will be seen in the examples to be cited below, the manner in which
the cases of forensic cases have been administered, must raise, at the very least,
severe reservations concerning the existing administrative provisions. This is
so despite the fact that 5. 29C of the existing Act clearly provides for a system
of 6 monthly review by a medical superintendent of the case of each forensic
patient. Although it will rapidly become clear in the light of the examples to be
given, that this provision is inadequate to ensure the task of review is properly
carried out, I must state that it is not my intention to lay the blame necessarily
at the feet of the medical superintendents involved.
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Case 3
This patient is now 75 years of age. In 1947 she was found not guilty on
the grounds of Mental Illness of murdering her two years and eight months old
child in 1944. She had been an inmate of the hospital concerned since 1944
and is subject to an order under the Lunacy Act of 1898. Without doubt, she
is the State’s longest serving prisoner, having been held in custody for 42 years.
As early as 1949, reports on her ﬁle note prognoses that “she is unlikely to
recover. Undoubtedly she will gradually deteriorate.” Her ﬁle indicates that she
was suffering from severe delusions and was assessed as a potential danger to
the community in the 1960’s. Despite the original prognosis noted above, by
the early 1970’s her condition had sufﬁciently stabilised so that in 1974, an
order was made pursuant to s. 29 of the present Act which allowed her the
freedom of the hospital grounds and permitted her to leave the hospital grounds
subject to the direction of the medical superintendent, but ordered to continue
to reside in the hospital.
In view of the severely limited freedoms allowed to the woman, the recitals
in the order contain the statement that she “is unlikely to be of any danger to
the community and no longer requires detention under strict security
conditions”. In turn, this order was based on an examination in 1974. In a
further examination in 1982, it was noted that “this lady could be managed in
a nursing home outside the hospital and there is‘no reason to further detain
her”. Yet a further examination and review was carried out in 1985, which
stated that “she is now no apparent danger to others but will need care and
shelter for the rest of her days.” The later two recommendations were forwarded ‘
to the Authorised Ofﬁcer under the Act, but the ﬁles do not reveal any action
which may have been taken to effect her discharge and placement in the
community.
This woman’s history, whilst held in custody at the hospital, raises many
worrying questions which cry out for answers. Her ﬁle reveals that since 1974,
examinations of her have resulted in ﬁndings that she has not been a potential
or actual danger to the community for some twelve years. Signiﬁcantly, these
very words used by her examining psychiatrist bear a .strong resemblance to the
words of s. 119 of the Mental Health Act 1983 in laying down the duty of the
Mental Health Review Tribunal to make recommendations to the ,Minister for
Health regarding the six monthly review of forensic patients, effectively, to
determine if “the safety of the patient or any member of the public will not be
seriously dangered by the patient’s release”.
Section 29 of the existing Mental Health Act already provides that, in
relation to Governor’s Pleasure prisoners, the Governor “may permit any_such
person . . . to be liberated from custody or such mental hospital upon such terms
and conditions as the Governor may think ﬁtc” indeed it was pursuant to this
section and power that this woman was allowed leave in 1974. The immediate .
question which comes to mind, is to ask why no steps were taken at that time
to either effect her discharge from hospital, or, at the very least, to formulate a
discharge plan.
Even more startling, is the fact that she has remained in custody despite
two speciﬁc recommendations not to do so made by the hospital authorities to
the authorised ofﬁcer. On the basis of the evidence noted above which is
’ gathered from the hospital’s own‘ﬁles, I would go so far as to say that it is
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virtually an inevitable conclusion that this women clearly fulﬁlls the criteria for
her discharge into the community laid down under s. l 19 of the Mental Health
Act 1983 and has done so for some twelve years. More tragically, in the twelve
years since 1974, it appears that she has become physically incapable of caring
for herself as the result of age and tardive dyskinesia, a disabling permanent
side effect caused by her medication.
Case 4
In 1977, a man in his late 20’s was found not guilty on the grounds of
mental illness on a charge of arson which involved throwing a petrol bomb from
his ﬂat. The majority of the next 7 years was spent by him in two hospitals but
included some time in the community living with his wife. After stabilisation
of his condition, he was released on a licence as a Governor’s Pleasure prisoner
into the care of his wife. Some 4 months later, at the request of his wife he was
admitted to a psychiatric hospital for presentation as a temporary patient
pursuant to a doctor’s medical certiﬁcate. After an overnight stay, he was
transferred to another hospital and held there for a period of 4 months. At no
stage, was he presented to a magistrate for an order to be made to detain him
as is required under s. 12 of the Mental Health Act 1958 or was his licence
allowing him to reside in the community revoked under s. 29 of that Act.
The man was subsequently interviewed by a solicitor of the Mental Health
Advocacy Service. After 4 months being held under illegal detention, the man
was released from the hospital by the Department of Health under threat of
legal action.
Without any doubt, it can be said that this man was held illegally for some
4 months. Further, after the man’s solicitor had made the initial demand for
his release, although the Department could have taken steps to detain him
legally either as a temporary patient under the Mental Health Act, or by
variation or revocation of his licence, no such action was taken. Following
consultation between a Mental Health Advocacy Service social worker and the
hospital’s placement ofﬁcer, the man returned to live with his wife and
arrangements were made for follow-up treatment from a local doctor and the
local community health centre. Certain conclusions can be drawn from the facts
of his case. First, the Department’s administrative procedures would appear to
be of such a standard that it cannot avoid committing illegal actions in the
course of carrying out its duties pursuant to Part VII of the Mental Health Act
1958. If this appears to be a harsh judgement, it should be mentioned that the
discharge of one further forensic patient being held pursuant to Part VII has
also been obtained by order of the Supreme Court as a result of Mental Health
Advocacy Service legal representation. This later case is based upon the
Department’s use of defective medical certiﬁcate in its use of s. 24.
The second conclusion is drawn from the fact that the Department chose
to permit the man to return to the community rather than to regularise its
detention of him. Under such circumstances there must be an implicit
agreement on the part of the Department’s relevant ofﬁcers under the Act that
this man did not seriously endanger his own safety or that of any member of
the public. This is further evidenced by the fact that a discharge plan was both
prepared and apparently agreed to by the medical superintendent of the hospital
and put into effect. On the basis of this premise, it may be further asked why
a similar discharge plan was not considered and put into effect some time
earlier.
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As stated at the outset of this paper, the purpose of bringing forward and
examining these four examples has not been for malicious purposes, but rather
as a reminder that the existing system of care for all types of psychiatric patients
is inadequate and does not meet the standards which can be expected in this
ﬁeld. The provisions of Parts IV, V, VI and VII of the Mental Health Act 1958
are couched in imprecise terms and give broad powers to Medical Practitioners
and hospital administrators to “get on with the job” of providing care and
treatment for those persons in society who are in need of them. On examination
of s. 12, whch deals with the admission procedure of temporary patients, legal
procedures and safeguards are framed so as to meet the perceived needs and
convenience of the hypothetical doctor and hypothetical hospital in their
hypothetical dayto day routine. The scheme of these particular parts of the Act
is to allow institutions and staff carrying out the duties under the Act a large
degree of administrative autonomy whilst keeping such external checks to a
minimum. In the light of the above examples, in my opinion, it cannot be said
that the expectations expressed in the drafting of these Parts of the Mental
Health Act 1958 have been met. If further evidence is sought for this
proposition, it is only necessary to refer to a study entitled Evaluation of the
Magistrates’ Inquiries at Rozelle and Gladesville Hospitals, September 1982 to
January 1983 by Leanne Craze.
The Mental Health Act 1983 has made a number of innovations which
recognize a number of important advances made in approximately the last ﬁve
years at hospitals where legal aid organizations have provided legal
representation. The most noteworthy of these include limits on medication, the
introduction of a concept of informed consent as deﬁned under the Act, controls '
on psychosurgery and electro-convulsive therapy (E.CT) and ensuring that
persons appearing before certain tribunals are dressed in street clothes.
Unfortunately, a reading of the Act reveals that these provisions do not apply
unifOrmly to all proceedings and all tribunals established under the Act. For
example, whilst all persons appearing before a magistrate to determine whether
or not that person should be made a temporary patient must be dressed in street
clothes, there is no such provision which applies to forensic patients appearing
before the Mental Health Review Tribunal nor to those people appearing before
a magistrate to validate consent to E.C.T. Similarly, on each of the two
occasions where a person must be presented to the Mental Health Review
Tribunal to consider further detention in hospital, the Tribunal is required to
inquire into the effect of medication on the patient’5 ability to communicate.
By contrast, there is no such provision in relation to forensic patients appearing
before the Mental Health Review Tribunal, nor even to temporary patients
appealing to the Mental Health Review Tribunal against a medical
superintendent’s refusal to discharge that patient.
Another inconsistency in the Act relates to the provisions controlling
sterilization of temporary, continued treatment and forensic patients (ss.
177—179). These sections provide that consent to sterilization in certain
circumstances must be given by the Mental Health Review Tribunal, where a
patient is either incapable of giving or capable but refuses to give consent.
Whilst s. 178 (1) provides that the Medical Superintendent may apply to the
Mental Health Review Tribunal for consent to the performance of sterilization,
division 3 of Part VIII which deals with sterilization inter alia, does not contain
any substantive duties which the Mental Health Review Tribunal must carry
'out either prior to or in the process of giving its consent. It is only the medical
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superintendent applying for the consent who must form an opinion that “it is
desirable, having regard to the interests of the patient or other person, to
perform a surgical operation on the patient or other person” (s. 177 (1)). Whilst
it is implicit that the Mental Health Review Tribunal should insure that the
provisions of the Division have been complied with before it gives consent,
there is no express duty for it to do so nor, surprisingly, does the Division deﬁne
consent for this purpose nor does it lay down a scheme of duties to be
considered during the hearing of the application. This should be contrasted with
the detailed duties in those divisions of the Act, dealing with the validating of
consent to E.C.T. and the consent to psychosurgery.
This inconsistency is a grave one in view of the serious consequences
involved in sterilization. Patients who are surgically sterilized are almost always
women. They often suffer from chronic or potentially chronic conditions with
a history of recurrent hospitalization. In addition, sterilization is also commonly
used for women who are developmentally disabled. In the main, the purpose
of sterilization is as a technique to make the management of such women easier,
although this purpose is not usually stated so bluntly. To those employing
sterilization, its appeal is largely two fold. First, it provides permanent and
effective contraception. Second, in terms of cost/beneﬁt, it is a relatively cheap
method.
The most serious consequence of this operation is that for the groups of
persons upon whom it is most frequently carried out, the result is effectively
permanent. The success rate of reversal depends upon the original surgical
technique used in, sterilization and is, in any case a costly micro-surgical
procedure. By and large, alternative methods of contraception depend on sex
and sexuality education for the women concerned. Such courses are complex
and must be given by specially trained educators. As an alternative to
sterilization, it is without doubt more expensive and more time consuming.
It must be conceded that other methods of contraception based on sex and
sexuality education are not always appropriate and will not always succeed.
However, its use as a mandatory step prior to sterilization is, I would suggest,
a recognition of that person’s right to the same standards of care which apply
generally at law. The direct analogy is with the psychosurgery provisions which
are, in turn, based upon the fact that in the past insufﬁcient attention has been
paid to fully explaining its consequences to persons who are at the very least
severely socially disadvantaged. Given the similar serious and permanent
consequences of sterilization, there are compelling reasons to extend to it
safeguards similar to those obtained in the psychosurgery provision. In
particular, this includes a specialized type of informed consent as well as making
legal representation mandatory, unless refused, at the Mental Health Review
Tribunal Proceedings. '
The Mental Health Act 1983 is unique in that it makes special provision
for legal representation of persons appearing before the bodies established under
it. With one exception, it is mandatory in all situations that a patient having a
matter before any of these bodies be present at the proceedings, except with
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the leave of the tribunal. In addition to the matters referred to earlier
proceedings before the Mental Health Review Tribunal for consent to the
performance of sterilizatidn or other surgery are not subject to such a provision
.(ss. 178 and 179).
Section 185 of the Mental Health Act 1983, states:
For the purposes of this Act, the fact that a person is a mentally ill
person shall be presumed not to be an impediment to the representation
of the person by a barrister or solicitor before the Tribunal, at an inquiry
under Section 88, before the Court or before the Psychosurgery Review
Board. ’
Such a provision is essential to enable the legal mechanisms instituted
under the Act to operate. The apparent intention of the section is to allow a
mentally ill person to play a full role in proceedings under the Act, as well as
institute proceedings in the Supreme Court. In particular, it would appear to
attempt to ensure that a mentally ill person is able to instruct his or her legal
representative directly without the intervention of a third party. The provision
is probably quite adequate before the tribunals created by the Act. The Supreme
Court Rules, however, provide that an incompetent person (a mentally ill person
who is unable to manage his or her affairs) must institute proceedings by means
of a Tutor. It is a moot point as to whether 5. 185 dispenses with the need for
a mentally ill person who is also an incompetent under the Supreme Court Rules
to have a Tutor in Supreme Court proceedings.
The section appears in the form of an irrebuttable presumption.
Unfortunately, it omits reference to inquiries under s. 169, being inquiries by
magistrates to determine the validity of an involuntary patient’s consent to
E.C.T., although that section does refer to patients who are capable of giving
such consent.
The signiﬁcance of the section should not be underestimated in that it
would serve to prevent a challenge to the validity of an advocate’s instructions
on the basis of the client’s alleged incapacity. Such challenges have occurred,
in particular, by Way of a suggestion that an advocate either cannot or ought
not put to a tribunal the instruction of a" psychotic or demented client. Implicit
in this challenge is the suggestion that the instructions are not the .true wishes ‘
of the person and that they cannot be the basis for an advocate to contest the
proceedings. Ironically, such challenges rarely occur where a psychotic or
demented person gives instructions to consent to the application before the
tribunal. In fact, it is my observation of people appearing before proceedings
under the 1958 Act that, if psychotic, they suffer from varying degrees of
disability. Indeed, the large majority of those who are psychotic are often able
to give instructions in relation to their circumstances prior to admission to
hospital, their treatment in the hospital and the effects of the medication which
they are given. In my opinion, this particular attitude is condescending and
cannot have a beneﬁcial effect in the doctor-patient relationship. For these
reasons, it is my opinion that s. 185' is a progressive step.
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The Act contains provisions for legal representation of persons before the
tribunal created under the act as follows:
'1. The patient shall, unless he/she decides not to be represented, be
represented before: '
(a) Mental Health Review Tribunal
All forensic patients (5. 50 (3)).
(b) Magistrate’s Committal Enquiries
All persons (5. 88 (5)).
2. The patient may be represented before:
(3) Mental Health Review Tribunal
Informal or continued treatment patients at Review (5. 50 (4)).
(b) Mental Health Review Tribunal
4 Temporary patient appealing under s. 109 (s. 50 (4)).
(c) Mental Health Review Tribunal
Any patient where consent is sought for sterilization or other surgery
(8 50 (3))
(d) Psychosurgery Review Board
All patients (s. 152 (c)).
3. The Act does not contain provision for representation of patients before:
(a) Magistrate’s E.C.T. Enquiries.
(b) - Supreme Court.
In the ﬁrst two categories the further option is also available of
representation, with approval, by another person of the patient’5 choice. This
provision would allow a patient to be represented by a lay advocate where
appropriate, such a situation may well arise where a person of non-legal training
possesses special knowledge in relation to the patient as well as concerning
alternatives to hospitalisation.
In regard to these provisions on representation, I would refer to my earlier
comments on inconsistencies in the Act. There can be little logic making
representation virtually obligatory in some proceedings and not for other
proceedings such as consent to psychosurgery or sterilization. In my opinion,
the drafting of the Act in this regard is unsatisfactory and should be rectiﬁed
Section 50 (3) of the Act provides:
A forensic patient having any matters before the Tribunal shall, unless
the forensic patient decides that he or she does not want to be represented,
be represented by a barrister or solicitor or, with the approval of the
Tribunal, by another person of his or her choice.
‘A similai provision appears in s. 88 (5) (a) in relation to persons being
presented before a magistrate for committal as a temporary patient
The formulation is unusual, and suggests something more than a right to
representation. The formulation appears to contain the following provisions.
. Prima facie a person must be legally represented.
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2. Before a person appears unrepresented he or she must have had the
opportunity to decide whether or not to refuse representation.
3. A decision to refuse representation must in fact have been made.
4. That decision must have been made in a voluntary manner.
In making such a decision, it is suggested that in order to make a valid
decision, a person must ﬁrst be in a position practicably to choose to instruct
a representative. The decision must be the result of a choice made voluntarily
and without duress. Further, the person must' have had the opportunity of being
made aware of the nature of the proceedings before the Tribunal, their possible
outcome and the provisions of s. 50 (3) itself.
If this interpretation seems a little lengthy, it should be recalled that the
High Court has held that the Mental Health Act 1958 should be strictly
construed. See Watson v Marshall (1971) 124 C.L.R. 621, at 629. ~
Section 50 (4) provides:
A patient, other than a forensic patient, _or a person detained in a
hospital having any matter before the Tribunal may be represented by a
barrister or solicitor or, with the approval of the Tribunal, by another
person of his or her choice.
While this provision uses the word “may”, it is clearly not a discretionary
power given to the Tribunal, rather the discretion or choice appears to be given
to the patient as the person appearing before the Tribunal. Where the patient
desires to be represented by a solicitor or barrister, no leave to do so would be
necessary, as these two speciﬁed classes of persons are involved. The Act is silent
as to representation by any other person and, presumably, leave to appear and
to be so represented is necessary. Thus, it is suggested that the provision
amounts to the right to be represented if the patient so chooses. In addition, it
follows that the patient also would have the right to an adjournment in order
to obtain legal representation. .
What would be the result if the new provision regarding a right to
representation were to be breached? At Common Law, even though a procedure
laid down in a statute is not properly complied with, the failure to follow the
correct procedure is void only if it is termed “mandatory”. If the correct
procedure is not mandatory then it is termed “directory” and its breach does
not make the proceedings void. There are also a number of other strict
provisions regarding procedure throughout the Act, for example, the giving of
notice and the enquiry as to the effect of medication. The following comments
would apply similarly to any breach of those matters. '
In Clayton v Heﬂron (1960) C.L.R. 214, the High Court was required to
consider the failure to comply with a strict and detailed procedure prior to and
during the convening of a joint sitting of New South Wales Parliament prior to
the holding of a referendum. The matter turned on whether or not the failure
to comply with the-precise procedure rendered the referendum itself void. The
court held that the breach would “mainly work inconvenience or worse on a
section of the public”. The breach was termed “directory” only and thus not
void. The court at page 247, contrasted this breach with “the acquisition or
exercise of private rights or privileges”, implying that procedural requirements
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in those terms would be termed mandatory and any breach of the proper
procedure therefore void.
In Willesee v Willesee (1974) 2 NSWLR 275, the Supreme Court
considered 5. 3 (l) of the First Oﬂenders (Women’s) Act 1918. The section
provides that “the hearing of such a charge and all proceedings, in connection
therewith, shall, unless the defendant elects to be tried in open court, be in
private”. The section is remarkably similar to the provisions of the Mental
Health Act 1983 now under discussion.
His Honour Mr Justice Holland considered whether the failure of a
magistrate in a Court of Petty Sessions to follow the provisions of s. 3 (l) of
that Act made the proceedings amenable to control by the prerogative writs and
thus void. At page 282, His Honour said:
. To achieve this intention, the legislature has expressed itself in s. 3
of the Act, not in terms of conferring a right on the class of persons for
whom the protection was intended but in terms of imposing duties on the
Tribunal, before which the proceedings are brought. I would be reluctant
to accept the view that in such a case, the court would not have intervened
by use of the prerogative writs—prohibition to prevent a continuance of
an existing violation of the statute and'mandamus to compel performance
of the statutory duty. -
In McInm's v R (1979—8) 143 C.L.R. 575, the High Court considered
whether a failure by a trial judge to grant an adjournment to an accused whose
barrister declined to represent him the day before the trial because of a refusal
of legal aid amounted to a miscarriage of justice. It should be noted that this
matter involved a charge of rape and the majority of judges laid special
emphasis on the distress caused to the prosecutrix by the delay in granting an
adjournment to the accused. Whilst the court remarkably held that the facts of
the case did not amount to a miscarriage of justice, it also spoke obiter of an
accused’s legal representation at trials of serious offences. It is suggested that in
matters where there is no factor equivalent to that of the prosecutrix’s distress,
these latter matters ought to be given effect to.
Barwick C.J., Wilson and Aickin J.J., held that in the absence of legislative
provisions the accused’s right to representation was only one important factor
amongst several in granting such an adjournment. As the majority, they held
that any right of the accused to representation had to be balanced against the
distress of the prosecutrix as a result of an adjournment. When balanced against
this particular element, they held that the judge was correct in refusing the
accused’s request for an adjournment.
Mason and Murphy, J.J ., held that the adjournment was wrongly refused.
Murphy 1., held that an accused had such a right in order to have a fair trial
and that it was an essential element in the administration of justice in such
cases.
In considering the construction of the Mental Health Act 1958, the High
Court has held in Watson v Marshall (1971) 124 C.L.R. 621 at 629, “that in
the interpretation of an Actwhich affects personal liberty, supposition as to the
intention of the legislature has no place and the function of the Court is limited
to interpreting and giving effect to its will, as expressed in the Statute.” In effect,
 41
the court stated that the 1958 Act should be construed strictly and by necessary
implication in a similar manner to which criminal statutes are interpreted.
There “is no reason to suppose that the High Court would not apply Watson v
Marshall to the Mental Health Act 1983, in general, and to the representation
provisions in particular.
All judges in Mclnnis’ case held that the accused’s right to representation
in serious criminal matters was of importance. The majority held that there was
no miscarriage of justice because of the competing factor peculiar to sexual
offence trials. There is no such similar competing factor in mental health
proceedings and therefore, it is suggested, that the right of a patient in such
proceedings is paramount. Further, the minority in McInnis’ case considered
legal representation to be a right.
The Supreme Court in Willesee’s case held that the breach of a procedure
couched in similar terms would make the proceedings void. The language used
in the Mental Health Act 1983 is sufficiently similar to support an interpretation
that the representation provisions therein place a duty upon the Tribunal to
ensure that the steps outlined earlier in order to comply with the requirements
are in fact met. Clayton v Heﬂron also supports this conclusion by suggesting
that “private rights” would be upheld in a similar manner, as opposed to
matters which would cause “inconvenience”.
If any conclusion is to be drawn from the legal representation provisions
in the Mental Health Act 1983, it is that they are the result of the years of
experience since 1977 which, as I have argued, have provided beneﬁts to the
individual patient as well as to the community in general. In my opinion, the
most desirable result of paying greater attention to the civil rights of the
individual is an increase in the standard of services provided to that person.
The Mental Health Act 1983 is itself one step in the recognition of this need.
One would hope that it is a ﬁrst and early step in this direction. The
inconsistencies which have been noted in this paper must be eliminated by
extending the safeguards to the individual in a consistent manner. If these
further steps can achieve the focusing of public attention on the need to provide
further services for the mentally ill, especially in the community, then it can be
said that all these steps can become a path towards progress.
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Irving Wallach
The Mental Health Advocacy Service has been referred to as an
organization which was unique in this State and probably in Australia. I know
that the Legal Aid Commission’s activities in this State providing representation
for people before the courts and also before other Tribunals does have a system
which is well developed and which does attempt to ensure that most people
who are unable through social or economic reasons to have representation can
have that representation.
The establishment of this unit itself is an important step forward because
it operates not only on the assumption that someone can be deprived of the
opportunity to put his or her case to advocacy through economic reasons, but
also by virtue of social reasons on the basis simply that a person may not have
the opportunity to have access to representation before his or her case is dealt
with by that Tribunal. That is something of which all of the solicitors, social
workers and the education ofﬁcer of the Mental Health Advocacy Service are
proud. I would say they are justly proud to ensure that a person who is going
to have his or her future affected in a fundamental way does have the
opportunity to put the case on his or her own behalf. It is not just a case that
a person would have the opportunity—as some people would have it—of having
a lawyer try and get that person off or get that person out, but also that a person
would thereby have the opportunity to obtain treatment if necessary as a
consenting person. Possibly the best type of treatment would become available
to that person. In the extreme case, where someone is to be deprived of not
only their liberty but also their right to consent to medical attention, where that
deprival of liberty is in no way warranted by the facts of the situation.
The Mental Health Act 1983 takes a lot of those things into consideration.
As you know it is not yet fully in operation. The provisions in relation to the
forensic patients have been proclaimed only in recent weeks and the Mental
Health Review Tribunal is now in its third week of sittings.
The provisions in relation to involuntary patients at hospitals are generally
not in application. It is the fact that the representation provisions under section
50 of the Act which provide that a person shall be represented unless that person
refuses are now in operation, and I would think that the policy and intention
of the Act itself reﬂects the concern of the government in establishing through
the Legal Aid Commission its Advocacy Service for patients.
The service itself consists not only of lawyers but also social workers and
an education ofﬁcer. The Commission has taken the view that in this particular
area it is not enough to have someone’s legal needs only met. Quite clearly the
vast majority of people do have other social needs which require attention and
need to be addressed at a time when they are facing a Tribunal of this State.
In addition, there is also the position of an education officer which does
recognize the importance that the community at large, including our client
group, are aware of their legal rights and that those professionals involved in
providing care for the mentally ill also become aware of the state of the law
and of the role of advocates in representing persons before the Tribunals under
the Mental Health Act.
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The intention of the Act has been to increase accountability, and not only
deal with the question of addressing individual rights. That is certainly a theme
which runs throughout the Mental Health Act 1983. I know that the question
of the term “accountability” is at this very moment a hot one, especially given
our other brothers in the legal profession, but it is certainly something which
affects patients and people who come within this area. The aim is to ensure
that things are now done publicly, that the person has the right to put before
the Tribunal, which is going to affect him or her, the available options from his
or her point of view or the facts of the situation. I would suggest the intention
of the policy is to have all this done openly and without any other factors which
may constrain those persons’ rights.
Having said that, I must say that there are some things of late which have
occurred which to my mind do raise issues of concern, and which do certainly
appear to ﬂy in the face of what I believe to be the policies and the intentions
of the new legislation.
The first relates to the actual operations of the Mental Health Review
Tribunal itself,-and I really cannot go into this matter in_ particular detail
because I have only just been appraised of a late development myself. It relates
to whether or not a person appearing before the Tribunal has the right to know
what recommendation is made to the Minister by the Tribunal and the reasons
for it. I feel I must tread very carefully here because it involves a matter in
which our chairman, Mr Davidson, has acted in his capacity as President of
the Tribunal.
I have just had Mr President’s decision handed to me and I have not read
his quite lengthy decision in the matter. I have read the “bottom line” and I
have read the back page (which is a habit of all lawyers as they go into court)
and the President in his wisdom has decided that there is no basis in law for
the Tribunal to give the reasons for its decisions to the patient or advocate or
to give the recommendation which it will pass on to the Minister. I really do
not want to say more about the actual decision because I have not read it and
I cannot really say anything in relation to it until I have done so. I would only
say I would have to disagree very strongly (as I put to the President during the
Tribunal’s sittings). Without going into the quite complex legal arguments
involved I would have to say that it is certainly contrary to the spirit and, I
would go further and say the policy, of the Act by effectively leaving a person
before the Tribunal in the dark as to what may or may not have been the result
of the representations made on his or her behalf and, further, not even knowing
the reasons for it. Given the fact that the system incorporates a six month
system of reviews it can well be the case that a Minister of Health could on the
same grounds or on similar grounds raised by the Tribunal likewise refuse to
inform the person what were the recommendations of the Tribunal or the
reasons for those recommendations. Apart from, to my mind, the quite clear
breach of any natural justice involved, it leaves the person (who ‘is in a situation
where that person has to have his or her case reviewed every six months) in
the dark as to what he or she may well put on the next occasion to the Tribunal
in order to have conditions ameliorated, in order to have release on conditions
considered, or an outright case for discharge from the hospital considered. I
regard that certainly as a very serious situation.
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The comment by Dr Sainsbury on my paper has been distributed. On page
64* there is what I ﬁnd a startling disclosure in relation to comments he made
on Case 3 which I have spoken about in my paper. He says as follows:
The fact is that a second set of ﬁles on forensic patients is kept at
central administration of the Health Department under lock and key. These
ﬁles have been made available to other legal ofﬁcers on request where this
is relevant and proper.
* * * *
Had the Mental Health Advocacy Service lawyer asked any of the
current authorised ofﬁcers, including the one working in Head Ofﬁce in .
another capacity as well, I am sure that the further information relevant
to Case No. 3 could have been made available—information which shows
clearly what further action was taken by the authorised ofﬁCer in question.
Now I personally am intrigued to discover the existence of this second set
of ﬁles. Since May this year it has been common knowledge to all relevant
ofﬁcers of the Health Department, and also amongst people involved in the legal
profession, that solicitors from the Mental Health Advocacy Service have been
taking instructions in order to advance their client’s case and to put their client’s
case before the Mental Health Review Tribunal. During that entire time no one
in the Mental Health Advocacy Service has been advised by any person in the
Health Department of the existence of a second set of ﬁles, a set of ﬁles which
I can only assume by implication are at the disposal of any of the authorised
ofﬁcers and presumably, Dr Sainsbury can correct me if I am wrong, at the
disposal of the Minister and his advisors at the time the Minister may make
his ﬁnal decision, as to the future of a person who appears before the Mental
Health Review Tribunal. It would be an understatement for me to say that I
am disturbed to ﬁnd at this stage, in the middle of the third week of sittings of
the Mental Health Review Tribunal after the cases of some 30 human beings
have been considered by that Tribunal, that a Minister in making his ﬁnal
decision will have access to information of which at the time that that person’s
representatives put that person’s case had no knowledge at all. One may well
say, as Dr Sainsbury does say: “had the Mental Health Advocacy Service lawyer
asked any of the current authorised ofﬁcers for ﬁles” that no one had any inkling
existed. He may well say that, but, of course, he does say so without anyone
having been informed of their existence. I think that statement can be seen for
what it is. One may well ask now what is the lawyer in each of those cases to
do. Ask that the Tribunal re-list each and every one of those cases after access
has been had or simply wait and go on and hope for the best.
Well, having been taken on the hop myself, certainly as regards that, I do
not think I can express an opinion about what ought to be done. Certainly those
two things just come to light recently, almost quite dramatically, one may well
ask whether or not the intentions of the Act are being carried out? How
meaningful exactly are the hearings at the Tribunal in the light of all of those
matters? I suppose having left those questions hanging I will conclude my
comments.
‘Note: Page 64, paragraph beginning “I can assure you . . .” was added at the seminar in reply to
these comments of Mr Wallach. [Editor]
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THE DEFINITION OF A MENTALLY ILL PERSON
Dr P. Shea, B.H.A.(Health Admin.)(N.S. W.), B.A., Dip.Env.Stud.,
M.EnvPlan. (Macquarie), MB., B.S. M.P..,H DP.M. Dip. Crim.(Sydney),
F.......,RANZCP 17.....RACMA., F.A.IM., L...HA
Director of Clinical Services, Rozelle and Gladesville Hospitals
In an article published in the Australian and New Zealand Journal of
Psychiatry in 1984,' I tried, as objectively as I could, to trace the historical
development of the deﬁnition of the term “mentally ill person” from the 1958
Mental Health Act, through the Edwards Committee and subsequent
committees, to its ﬁnal version in the 1983 Act. One of the assessors of the
article suggested that it would be interesting to have my own views on the
subject rather than just an objective recital of the facts. In reply, I said that I ‘
would present my views in a dilferent forum at a more appropriate time. This
appears to be a suitable forum and, with the imminent proclamation of the
Mental Health Act, it is certainly a suitable time, so let me tell you what I think
of the deﬁnition of the term “mentally ill person” in the 1983 Mental Health
Act.
I don’t intend to spend any time going through the deﬁnition as it stands
because I assume that all the people at this seminar have a vested interest, in
one way or another, in the new Mental Health Act and are therefore already
familiar with the term “mentally ill person” and the way it is deﬁned in the
Act. I intend, instead, to concentrate on several speciﬁc aspects of the deﬁnition
that I consider need a public airing.
Let me just say ﬁrst of all, however, that any deﬁnition of “mentally ill
person” is purposive and the purpose needs to be clearly understood and stated.
Similarly, any deﬁnition of “mentally ill person” has an underlying philosophy
or ideology and that also needs to be understood and stated. In general, the
purpose of a deﬁnition of “mentally ill person” is to enable people who (a) have
a mental illness, and (b) in addition to their mental illness have certain
behavioural abnormalities that are presumably associated with and/or caused
by the mental illnesss, to be (a) temporarily removed from society, and (b)
assessed and treated against their will and/or without their consent.
All these issues (the deﬁnition of mental illness, the nature of the
behavioural disturbances, the removal from society and forceable (and/or
nonconsensual) treatment) are contentious issues and raise a plethora of
medical, legal and social problems, none of which will ever be resolved to the
satisfaction of everybody in society. There always have been and always will be
two or more sides to every one of these issues and there are persuasive
arguments on all sides, ranging between the extremes of the “humanitarian”
argument (“people who are mentally incapable of looking after themselves need
to be looked after by somebody else”), an argument which is sometimes stated
as a “rights” argument (“people who are mentally incapable of looking after
themselves have the right to be cared for by the State”), and the civil libeitarian
argument (“nobody has the right to take control of the mind of somebody else
' Shea, P. B. (1984), “The Statutory Deﬁnition of a Mentally Ill Person in N.S.W., 1958—1983",
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 18:218.
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without that person’s approval”). For the purposes of this paper I have, of
course, caricatured the three arguments.
Whether or not a person with a mental illness and associated behavioural
disturbances should be removed from society and treated forceably are matters
for society in general to determine (through their elected representatives). The
bottom line is the type of society one wants to live in. I do not intend to deal
with these issues here although I consider them to be vitally important issues.
What I do intend to deal with are the other two issues—(1) the deﬁnition of
mental illness, and (2) the nature of the associated behavioural disturbances that
need to be tacked on to the deﬁnition of “mental illness” to complete the
deﬁnition of a “mentally ill person” for legal purposes.
The deﬁnition of mental illness is not a simple matter. There is no
satisfactory, all-embracing, all-purpose deﬁnition of mental illness. It simply
does not exist. There are a number of separate mental disturbances which,
traditionally, have been clumped together and called mental illnesses but they
are a very disparate group of conditions indeed and it is very difficult to ﬁnd a
common unifying factor or thread to explain why they are clumped together in
this way. There is certainly no common aetiological factor. One could be
simplistic and say that they are all disorders of the mind but this doesn’t really
get us very far. We are just substituting one term for another similar term and
the term we are substituting, the “mind”, is a rather slippery concept in itself.
Now, while there may not be any satisfactory, all-embracing, all-purpose
deﬁnition of mental illness, there are, as pointed out above, certain individual
illnesses that are clumped together and called “mental illnesses”. These are the
illnesses listed in any standard textbook of psychiatry and in various
international classiﬁcations of mental illness or mental disorder such as the
International Classiﬁcation of Diseases (LCD. 9) and the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of the American Psychiatric Association
(D.S.M. III). The problem here, however, is that the lists do not always coincide
and even where they do and there is general agreement that a particular mental
illness exists, there is often disagreement as to what signs and symptoms
constitute that particular mental illness. The classical example of this is, of
course, schizophrenia.
For many years, these difficulties have been seen to constitute an
insuperable barrier to a precise deﬁnition of the “mental illness” part of the
term “mentally ill person”. I would like to suggest a possible way out of this
dilemma because I happen to believe that the interests of all parties concerned
(patients, relatives, professionals involved in treatment and management, and
legal personnel alike) wOuld be served far better by having speciﬁc deﬁnitions
of mental illnesses that could be used over and over again than having vague,
completely open terminology that has to be re-argued in every magistrate’s
inquiry and every Tribunal hearing. I believe that, in the past, too much
emphasis has been placed on the problems arising from the differences between
the various deﬁnitions that are available. I do not believe that these differences
constitute an insuperable barrier to precise deﬁnition for legal purposes because
if you look at the differences closely, they are usually differences of emphasis
not insuperable differences of opinion. I therefore propose a pragmatic
approach.
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I suggest that an appropriately constituted and balanced committee
consisting of, Say, psychiatrists, lawyers, magistrates, judges and consumer
representatives, should be given the task of devising a list of those illnesses that
most people would agree are clearly mental illnesses. The list would probably
be fairly small in the ﬁrst instance and would include at least the functional
psychoses (schizophrenia, mania, major depression, manic-depressive psychosis
and the paranoid psychoses). Whether other conditions, such as the organic
psychoses, especially dementia, should be included is a matter that would have
to be debated but eventually it should be possible to arrive at a list that was a
reasonable consensus. The next step would be for the same committee to
provide operational deﬁnitions for each mental illness on the list. The
operational deﬁnitions would also be a matter for debate and consensus but the
deﬁnitions in the standard classiﬁcations referred to above (the LCD. 9 and
the D.S.M. III) would provide a useful starting point for discussion.
The next problem is what to do with the list. It needs to be given some
authoritative weight and there are various ways this could be done.
(1) It could be enshrined in the Mental Health Act itself. It is interesting to'
note that there has already been a hesitant step in this direction in the 1983
Act with (a) the naming of the manic phase of a manic-depressive illness
as an illness for the purposes of the deﬁnition of a “mentally ill person”,
and (b) the reference to the “serious and permanent phySiological,
biochemical and psychological effects of drug-taking” (which seems to me
to mean dementia) as “mental illnesses” for the same purpose. I will return
to this later. The problem with enshrining such lists and deﬁnitions in a
statute is that it tends to set them in legal concrete. If it was considered
appropriate, perhaps just the list of conditions could be included in the
Act. The deﬁnitions could be promulgated by way of regulation under the
Act
(2) Alternatively, both the list of conditions and their deﬁnitions could be
’ promulgated by way of regulation This certainly allows for greater
ﬂexibility but it may allow for too much ﬂexibility so there would need to
be some way of ensuring that changes in the regulations were not made
on the basis of administrative whim but only after an extensive
consultative process involving the people who Originally devised the list
(or a similar group).
(3) A third possibility is to circulate the list and the deﬁnitions as a statement
ofpolicy with the imprimatur of both the Department of Health and the
Attorney-General's Department
Whichever of these options was considered most appropriate (and there
are probably a number of other options that I haven’t considered) there would
also need to be a provision for changing the list and the deﬁnitions from time
to time. And just to forestall criticism, I might point out that I have no strong
personal commitment to any of these proposals. I am merely putting them
forward to stimulate discussion.
Nature of associated behavioural disturbances
With the “mental illness” part of the deﬁnition in place, the next problem
to solve would be the behavioural elements that need to be tacked on to
complete the deﬁnition of a “mentally ill person”. The 1959 Act was rather
.vague on this matter and used woolly terms such as “for his own good or in
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the public interest” and people preparing the 1983 Act rightfully decided to be
more speciﬁc. They decided, however, that the appropriate categories of
behaviour would be restricted to actual or threatened physical harm, through
act or neglect, to oneself, and actual or threatened physical harm to others and
nuisance and harassment to others “which would be reasonably likely to lead
to violence and which is of a degree so far beyond the limits of normal social
behaviour that a reasonable person would consider it intolerable”. I might just
note in passing that, in the ﬁeld of mental illness, the “reasonable person”
concept itself could raise a quite a few problems. I don’t want to dwell on this
point but we may be able to raise it again in question time if anyone wants to
pursue it. I want, instead, to go on to s. 5 (1) (a) (v) of the Mental Health Act
(1983) because this is one of the most fascinating parts of the Act and it
illustrates the many pitfalls that people devising a deﬁnition of a “mentally ill
person” can fall into.
S. 5 (1) (a) (v) came into the Act between the 1982 Bill and the 1983 Bill
and it states that, in the case of a person in the manic phase of a manic-
depressive illness, harm other than physical harm (to wit, “serious ﬁnancial
harm or harm to his or her reputation or standing in the community”, i.e.
serious ﬁnancial or social harm) can be considered as behavioural disturbances
for the puposes of the deﬁnition of a “mentally ill person”.
Now this brings us to philosophies and ideologies and politics and the
starting off point might be to ask: why physical, ﬁnancial or social harm in the
case of a person in the manic phase of a manic-depressive psychosis but physical
harm only in the case of all other mental illnesses? The psychiatrists advising
the Health Department put forward a very strong case for the inclusion of
serious social and ﬁnancial harm as behavioural elements for all forms of mental
illness at the time the 1982 Bill was being prepared. Their arguments were
forcefully and totally rejected, not by' the Health Department but by the
Attorney-General’s Department, and it so happened that the Attorney-General’s
Department’s wishes‘ prevailed. Serious social and ﬁnancial harm were not
included as behavioural elements for any mental illness in the 1982 Bill. In the
1983 Bill, however, they were included but only for people in the manic phase
of a manic-depressive illness. If it was considered ideologically unsound to
include serious ﬁnancial and social harm at all in the 1982 Bill, why was it
included in the 1983 Bill and why speciﬁcally for people in the manic phase of
a manic-depressive illness? The answer is, quite simply, political. When the 1982
Bill was tabled, submissions were invited from interested parties. Among the
submissions received was a very persuasive submission from the manic-
depressive group who lobbied heavily on their own behalf for a provision
whereby they could be treated involuntarily in times of crisis. In response to
that lobby, the clause about serious ﬁnancial or social harm in the case of a
person in the manic phase of a manic-depressive illness was inserted. There are,
of course, no logical reasons whatever for distinguishing between people in the
manic phase of a manic-depressive illness and'people with other major mental
illnesses in this way. People with other severe, mental illness, such ' as
schizophrenia or major depression, are likely to suffer as much ﬁnancial or social
harm from their illness as people in the manic phase of a manic-depressive
illness. And schizophrenia and major depression are, of course, much more
common than manic-depressive illness and likely to affect a much larger number
of people.
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One might also ask, why the manic phase only of a manic-depressive
illness? Why wasn’t mania per se included? This is very difﬁcult to understand.
I have the suspicion that it was a drafting error because it just doesn’t make.
sense otherwise, but I would be interested to hear from anyone who was mor
e
directly associated with the ﬁnal drafting of the Act as to whether there is some
' alternative logical explanation. ~*
My opinion, for what it is worth, is that harm other than physical harm
should be included as a general provision in the deﬁnition of a “mentally .ill
person” for all mental illnesses, provided there is agreement, as proposed earlier,
about the list of mental illnesses recognised for the purpose of the Act and
provided adequate safeguards are present (as they are in the 1983 Act) to
prevent unnecessary detection.
Next, I want to deal with the vexed question of dementia. And let me
approach it by way of mental retardation (or developmental disability of the
mind). I think that most authorities would agree than mental retardation is not
mental illness but an entirely separate disorder (or group of disorders). Mental
retardation is caused by physical damage to, or arrested development of, the
brain. But dementia is also caused by physical damage to the brain. There are
no psychological reasons why people become demented. Physical damage occurs
and while this, in turn, may lead to psychological signs and symptoms
developing, the latter are clearly the result of the dementing process, not the
cause. So one could argue, by analogy, that if mental retardation is not a mental
illness because it is caused by physical factors not psychological factors; then
dementia, which is simply brain damage at the other end of the age spectrum,
is not mental illness either because it is clearly caused by physical factors not
psychological factors. This is a very persuasive argument. It is, however, an
argument with very far-reaching consequences. Some people might argue, for
example, quite reasonably, that illnesses such as schizophrenia and major
depression can have physical causes and that there is a large body of evidence
(from the ﬁelds of genetics and biochemistry) to support this hypothesis. It is
even possible to extend the argument further and to argue that all mental -
activity is the result of physico-chemical activities in the brain (unless one
postulates a mind independent of the brain, an argument that I do not wish to
get into as it involves abandoning the realm of psychiatry for the realms of
metaphysics and theology) and that all mental illnesses, therefore, have an
underlying physical substrate.
Let me get 'back to the speciﬁc topic ’of dementia, for an interest
ing
situation will arise with the proclamation of the 1983 Act. Mr Justice
Powell,
as you are all probably aware, has determined that neither dementia nor men
tal
retardation are mental illnesses for the purposes of the deﬁnition of a “mentally
ill person” in the 1958 Act. According to Mr Justice Powell, dementia fa
lls into
the category of “mental inﬁrmity due to age” and this is not the same as mental
illness. In the 1983 Act, however, dementia from at least one cause—drug—ta
king
(which includes alcohol)—is clearly considered to be a mental illness for the
purposes of the deﬁnition of a “mentally ill person” in the Act; The latter is a
fascinating inclusion in the Act and, again, I think it came about because of a
drafting error. In the 1982 Bill, certain conditions were excluded, under s. 5 (2)
from the deﬁnition of a “mentally ill person” and, as just pointed out, they
included drug-taking. This was intended to exclude lifestyle situations, i.e. it
was intended to ensure that a person whose lifestyle involved heavy drug and
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alcohol use could not, by virtue of that lifestyle alone, be treated as a “mentally
ill person” under the Act. In line with this ideology, it was proposed that the
Inebriates Act be repealed when the new Mental Health Act was proclaimed. It
was obvious, however, that there was a need for a provision to ensure that
people suffering from the side-effects and complications of their drug and
alcohol-taking were not excluded from treatment under the Mental Health Act.
In all the discussions in which I took part at the time, however, and these
included discussions, at ministerial level, the focus of discussion were the toxic
psychoses, i.e. the acute complications of drug and alcohol taking (such as the
L.S.D. or amphetamine psychoses and delirium tremens). It was because of the
need to be able to treat the toxic psychoses such as these that s. 5 (3) was
included in the 1982 Bill. S. 5 (3) stated that nothing in s. 5 (2) (which was the
subsection that excluded drug-taking per se as mental illness) prevented “in
relation to a person who takes or has taken drugs, the physiological, biochemical
or psychological effects of drug-taking from being regarded as an indication that
the person is mentally ill”. This subsection clearly picked up people with toxic
psychoses from drug taking or alcohol abuse and allowed them to be treated
under the Mental Health Act. Somewhere between the 1982 Bill and the 1983
Bill, the words “serious and permanent” were inserted into s. 5 (3) and this,
unfortunately, excludes the toxic psychoses, which were the very conditions that
s. 5 (3) in the 1982 Bill was designed to catch. What it does catch, instead, are
the drug and alcohol induced dementias.
Once the 1983 Act is proclaimed, it will be possible to argue, quite forcibly,
on the basis of s. 5 (3), that if dementia from drug and alcohol taking is
considered to be a mental illness, then dementia from all causes should be
considered to be mental illness. This is a matter that will need to be brought
to the attention of the Supreme Court, through a test case, at the earliest
opportunity following proclamation of the Act.
A ﬁnal minor point which needs to be corrected in the deﬁnition of a
“mentally ill person” in the 1983 Act is s. 5 (2), which states, in its stem, “A
person is not a mentallyill person by reason only of any one or more of the
following”, and then goes on to list the conditions that are excluded, such as
drug-taking. This is a triﬂe confusing because the exclusion clauses clearly relate
to the “mental illness” part of the deﬁnition of a “mentally ill person” not the
deﬁnition as a whole. I would suggest that the stem be altered to make this clear.
Now I know that what I have said is going to annoy some people,
particularly as I am suggesting that changes are needed before the new Act is
proclaimed. I am also a realist and am aware that such changes are most
unlikely to occur. I believe, however, that the problems that the deﬁnition of a
“mentally ill person” in the new Act are likely to cause, should be brought to
people’s attention well in advance of the proclamation of the Act, so that people
can prepare themselves. I am also hopeful that this paper will act as a catalyst
to change sometime in the future. If I could brieﬂy summarise the main message
of this paper, it would be that the deﬁnition of a “mentally ill person” in the
1983 Act is a bit like the house that Topsy built. It doesn’t just need
reconstruction work. It needs to be reworked from the ground upwards.  
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Dr Peter Shea
I am talking about the deﬁnition of the mentally ill person in the new Act.
It is the most important part of the Act. Everything else revolves around it.
There are some problems with that deﬁnition as it now stands. I would like to
run through them fairly brieﬂy.
I have mentioned four in my paper:
The ﬁrst is a fairly simple matter—the fact that a person in the manic
phase of a manic depressive illness is mentioned as being mentally ill for the
purposes of the Act. As I point out in my paper this is ridiculous. People who
have mania per se have exactly the same illness as a person in the manic phase
of a manic depressive illness. Yet the way it is phrased it would appear as
though that people with mania per se would be excluded from the deﬁnition of
mental illness. The deﬁnition should be changed to mania per se. This is only
a small point but the signiﬁcance of the sections dealing with mania is that it
also includes under the deﬁnition of harm, protection from not just physical
harm but also protection from ﬁnancial and, to summarise, social harm as well.
Now, this is interesting because it was not in the original Bill which went into
Parliament in December 1982. It came into the 1983 Bill after representations
were made by people from manic depressive self-help groups themselves who
felt that they should be able to be treated at times involuntarily if they were
suffering from the manifestations of the illness.
The question you have to ask is why would you put in protection from
social harm and ﬁnancial harm in the case of a manic patient and leave out
protection from ﬁnancial and social harm in the case of a person with
schizophrenia, or a person indeed in the depressed phase of a manic depressive
illness or a person who is just plain depressed? All these people can suffer from
ﬁnancial harm and they can suffer from social harm, and they can suffer every
bit as much ﬁnancial harm and social harm as people in the manic phase of a
manic depressive illness, so it is logically absurd to just include the people in
the manic phase of a manic depressive illness. So you might ask indeed why is
it in there in that case? I might say I agree with it being in there. I think it is
very important to have it there but I think .it should be extended. It is there
because it is a fact that people who have a manic depressive illness tend to come
from a slightly higher social class than people say with schizophrenia. They also
tend to be more often very articulate, and they were a very powerful lobby group
when the submissions were asked for on the 1982 Bill. The people who speak
on behalf of the schizophrenic population of this world are very few indeed.
They are nowhere near as articulate as those who speak on behalf of the manic
depressive group and their views were not heard. It was as simple as that.
I am speaking on behalf of the rest of the mentally ill people in this world
and I am suggesting that the provision to include protection from serious
ﬁnancial or social harm should be extended to people suffering from other forms
of mental illness-and not just people in the manic phase of a manic depressive
' illness. That is the ﬁrst point.
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The second point I want to discuss is the question oﬂdementia. It is not
mentioned as such in the Act but the Act in s. 53 raises a very interesting point.
If you have seen the wording of s. 53 you will see that it says that nothing in
sub-section 2 which deals with the exclusion clauses prevents, in relation to a
person who takes or has taken drugs (which includes alcohol) (these are the key
words), “the serious and permanent physiological, bio-chemical or psychological
effects of drug taking being regarded as an indication that a person is mentally
ill”. The only thing that I can think of that is a serious and permanent effect
of drug taking (which includes alcohol) is dementia. I have racked my brains
for others. I thought of a few long term hallucinoses and so on but the major
group is obviously dementia. So on the one hand we have this section of the
new Act saying that dementia from drug and alcohol taking is in fact mental
illness. On the other hand we have a series of Supreme Court decisions by Mr
Justice Powell saying that dementia is not a mental illness for the purpose of
the Act, which is an interesting paradox.
I might say by the way that this particular section was not intended to read
the way it does. When it was ﬁrst written the words “serious and permanent”
did not occur in that particular clause. The clause was intended to catch the
person who was suffering from a toxic psychosis, a person in the acute phases
of a psychosis from taking L.S.D. or alcohol, or other drugs, or the withdrawal
phase of certain drugs.
Somewhere between the 1982 Bill and the 1983 Bill somebody put in the
words “serious and permanent” which totally changed what the clause was
intended to mean. It was not intended to mean dementia at all, it was intended
to mean toxic psychosis. I presume it is a drafting error but it has totally
changed the meaning of this part of the Act. I am hopeful that that part can be
altered to include the original meaning of the legislation.
Finally the last point is the point I make in the opening pan of my paper
where I say that I would like to see mental illness deﬁned in some way at law,
and I have suggested that there should be a committee to look at this. I would
not have said this ﬁve years ago to be perfectly honest and anybody who has
listened to my lectures over the years knows I hate using psychiatric labels. I
do not think labels help us to understand people terribly well. So why am I
suggesting that we use psychiatric labels in an Act of Parliament or in
regulations under the Act to deﬁne mental illness? There are two reasons. There
is a precedent for it in the 1983 Act. The phrase, the manic phrase of a manic
depressive illness is included and that is a diagnosis, a label.
But secondly we have seen a lot of decisons coming down from the
Supreme Court in which the judge on the bench makes his own mind up about
what he thinks should be mental illness for the purposes of the Act. At least at
the moment it is the 1958 Act. I think that is not the way to go about deﬁning
what is or what is not mental illness. I think it should be decided by a group
of the people who are involved in caring for patients, the relatives and friends
of patients, and the patients themselves and I think it should be enshrined in
some way in the legislation. To forestall all the comments I am going to get
about this I would like to bring to your attention some of the comments I have
already received.
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One of the comments is that if you do this there is a danger of making the
list too broad or too narrow. That is a danger, I agree, but I think that we can
introduce a system to ensure that new conditions can be introduced to the list
and other conditions taken out by appeal mechanisms. I have also had people
tell me that the labels may be too restrictive in that you need a fairly broad
deﬁnition, so that where you have a person you cannot diagnose immediately
you can use a broad term like mental illness itself and then settle for a deﬁnition
later. I think that can be overcome by having a broader stem at the start of the
deﬁnition and then saying: “and this includes conditions such as schizophrenia,
depression, mania, toxic psychosis, dementia, and so on”. People have told me
it is too hard because you get all sorts of degrees of schizophrenia, for example.
Some people have a lot of symptoms, some people have a few. My answer is
you get various degrees of heart disease as well. That does not preclude you
from treating a person who has heart disease. I know it is diﬂicult to use
deﬁnitions but I do not think it is impossible.
I think there are many other problems in the present Act and one of the
major things missing from the Act is a consistent ideology, some sort of
underlying philosophy which guides and directs the Act. It has arisen through
a whole series of committees and each of those committees has added things
to the Act or has. taken things away from the Act. All the committtees have had
different people on them and they have all thought in different ways. The result
is that we have, as I say in the paper, something like 'the house that Topsy built.
In my opinion it needs a total revision, rather than further tinkering.
I would like to see the thrust Of the Act being towards community
treatment'orders rather than having particular places gazetted to which people
are taken. I would rather see community treatment orders which can be put on
a person wherever they live or happen to be.
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DANGEROUSNESS
M. J. Sainsbury, RFD, M.H.P., MB, BS, F.R.A.N.Z.C.P., F.R.C.Psych., D.P.M.
Senior Specialist, Mental Health Services, N.S.W. Department of Health.
The Mental Health Act 1983, and the Crimes (Mental Disorder) Amendment
Act 1983, have forced all concerned with the care, treatment and control of
persons who are mentally ill, to focus particular attention on to the concept of
dangerousness.
There is a need to deﬁne, diagnose, and even to predict this condition.
Who best can do this?
A Task Force of the American Psychiatric Association back in 1974 made
the following statement:
The ability of psychiatrists or any other professionals to reliably
predict future‘violence is unproven.
It is now twelve years on and I don’t really know whether the American
Psychiatric Association has cause to change its mind today. However, it has
fallen largely to the lot of psychiatrists to act as prophets and guides in three
situations: the criminal courts, in civil commitment procedures, and in decisions
on the release of offendersl where potential violence or dangerousness is a factor
to be considered. ' ‘
I expect this is the reason for the topic of dangerousness to be given to a
psychiatrist at this seminar. In defence of the choice of discipline to speak on
this topic it is the psychiatrist who almost certainly spends more time than most
professionals in getting to know people, not simply at a superﬁcial level but at
the level of raw emotion, delusional belief and motive. So one could assume
that a clinical psychiatrist should be reasonably placed to predict violent
behaviour.
This assumption, however, is probably incorrect and has been challenged
from both inside and outside the ranks of psychiatrists. Indeed the diagnosis of ;
dangerousness is based on inquiry and examinations that extensively pursue
areas of concern not fully dealt with in routine psychiatric assesmentz, and
unless a psychiatrist develops a particular interest and has experience in
assessing dangerous potential, his intuitive guess may be little or no better than '
the next person’s guess.
I
My own particular involvement in assessing the potential for violence in
people must be regarded as limited, being comprised of the past three and one
half years spent as an authorized ofﬁcer under the Mental Health Act. Part of
the role of an authorized ofﬁcer is to accept responsibility for security conditions
pertaining to forensic patients detained in our psychiatric hospitals; and an
' Mullen. P. E. ‘Mental Disorder and Dangerousness, Review Anicle’, Australian and New Zealand
Journal QfPsychiatry (I984) 18: p. 9.
2 Kozol, H. L., Boucher, R. 1., Garofalo, R. F. ‘The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness’,
Crime and Delinquency, 18 (October, 1972) p. 383.
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appraisal of dangerousness is essential before authorizing the transfer of a
patient to a less secure environment or authorizing the giving of more degrees
of freedom which would entail contact with civil patients in hospital, and in
many instances, ultimate contact with the general community. With. such
limited personal experience I shall draw heavily on a review article by Mullen
entitled “Mental Disorder and Dangerousness”3 and on other relevant literature.
Unless touched by mental illness in a friend or relative, it appears to me
that people in general are less concerned about a person’s dangerousness towards
himself/herself than they are about dangerousness towards others, themselves
included, and it is on this latter aspect of dangerousness that we shall
concentrate.
Deﬁning dangerousness
In order to focus on the concept of dangerousness it seems not
unreasonable to start with the topic of violence.
Violence may be a perfectly ordinary non-pathological phenomenon. It may
or may not lead to dangerous behaviour. It may be seen in a broad spectrum
of events, for example, boys ﬁghting in the school playground, boxing matches,
pub brawls, armed robbery, and warfare. Violence is universal among social
animals and has complicated functions. Like all complex behaviour it has
complex origins and is (perhaps) best understood as being caused by an
interaction of factors, some social, some related to habit and learning, others
psychological and some medical, either physical or psychiatric.“
At primary school I was leader of a gang—naturally the goodies. It was
my role as leader to match the skills of the other gang’s leader. It was a
competitive situation involving playing marbles, playing soccer with a tennis
ball, the ubiquitous police and robbers, and naturally enough the occasional ﬁght
or test of physical strength. This latter I tried to avoid if possible because the
leader of the other gang was captain of the under 6 stone Queensland State
Schoolboys Rugby League side and I was considerable lighter than 6 stone.
This competitiveness/rivalrous situation which occasionally erupted into
violence was sometimes carried on after school hours. One afternoon my gang
and I were in our fort made of sticks and whatever foliage we could ﬁnd on a
vacant allotment. Our rivals were similarly housed. World War II was being
fought but we had our own private local war with our home made wooden
swords and useless bows and arrows which I don’t recall ever being shot in
anger. Most of our warfare was in the mind or imaginations. It- could hardly be
regarded as dangerous until some clown in the opposing gang started shooting
at us with a Daisy air riﬂe.
A harmless if potentially violent situation had become a dangerous one.
Sticks and stones, apart from the David and Goliath incident, are no match
3 See Mullen, op. cit. _
" Gunn, John, Chapter entitled ‘Forensic Psychiatry’ in Recent Advances in Clinical Psychiatry,
. Number Three; edited by Kenneth Granville-Grossman (Churchill Livingstone, Edinburgh, London
and New York I979) p. 275.
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against real weapons so we beat a hasty retreat back to the protection of one
of my gang’s mother who lived nearby. We concluded that the chap with the
air riﬂe was dangerous.
I have learned since that dangerousness is not a quality of an individual
but of that individual’s actions. Dangerous actions are" not non-speciﬁc actions
occurring in a vacuum. They occur within contexts which have particular
meanings for the individual who performs the actions. Dangerous actions are
in the main intentional and are carried out by people who are, or who believe
themselves to be, in a situation which justiﬁes and. precipitates them toward
aggressive action5.
The boy with the air riﬂe could well have been under extreme albeit
imagined threat believing that we in our fort matched the combined genius of
our better wartime leaders, and were about to deliver some fatal thrust to his
side. This may have been his justiﬁcation for ﬁring at us.
In passing, it should be mentioned that raw emotion and delusional belief
associated With mental illness appear to take a back seat to motives not
psychiatrically determined in this day and age; and it would be remiss not to
highlight political and religious ideologies as being important ingredients in the
concept of dangerousness. Throughout history these have provided the
motivation for wholesale violence. Such motivation can also underlie the actions
of some of the individuals who come within our purview.
To deﬁne dangerousness would reify it and in view of the fact that a
dangerous act requires an actor and a background and another player or other
players, it is best perhaps to vaguely delineate it as “a propensity to cause
serious physical injury or lasting psychological harm to others” (Butler
Committee, 1975)6 or as “a potential for inﬂicting serious bodily harm on
another”. We shall conﬁne ourselves to the latter deﬁnition.
Who are the dangerous?
We can start by dispelling the myth that mental illness in a global sense
correlates with dangerousness. There may, however, be certain sub-groups
within the mentally disordered population who are more prone to violence than
others. This will become apparent as we proceed. Three main types of study
have been carried out to determine a possible relationship between mental
illness and dangerousness. ~
The ﬁrst of these have looked at conviction rates for ex-psychiatric hospital
patients. The earlier studies suggested levels of subsequent conviction lower or
similar to that of the general population.
More recent studies have suggested that discharged mental patients may
be more dangerous than the average citizen. Many of these later studies have
been criticised for methodological ﬂaws, including a failure to control, for
5 Muller. op. cit. p. 9.
6 ibid. p. 7.
7 Kozol or al., op. cit. p. 372.
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example, the relevant demographic variables, sample sizes and previous arrest
records. Indeed one critic of these recent studies has concluded that “the higher
rate of violent crime committed by released mental patients can be accounted
for entirely by those patients with a record, particularly an extensive record, of
criminal activity that predated their hospitalisation” (Monahan, 1981)“. On the
other side of the coin, Sobowsky (1980),9 refutes this by pointing out that in his
series, ex-patients with no previous arrests had three times the subsequent rate
of offending when compared with the average citizen.
Mullen concludes that the studies available are simply not able to give a
deﬁnitive answer and do not justify abandoning the null hypothesis that there '
is no correlation between the status of an ex-psychiatric patient and a conviction
for a crime of violence.
He, however, goes on to quote the studies of Hafner and Boker (1982)l0
from the Federal Republic of Germany, who surveyed over ten years all crimes ,
of violence committed by mentally disordered individuals. They used a narrow
and strict deﬁnition of mental disorder which equates it with mental illness.
Their ﬁndings showed that the relative probability of mentally disordered
individuals committing a violent crime did not exceed the dangerousness of the
legally responsible adult population as a whole.
However, the study also looked at mentally normal offenders as well as
the main target population of mentally disordered offenders, and it looked also
at non-offending mentally disordered individuals. A number of factors emerged,
suggesting there may be higher risk groups within the totality of mentally
disordered individuals. For example, in comparison with the non-violent
mentally abnormal population, the mentally abnormal oﬁenders had a stronger
family history of offending and they were themselves signiﬁcantly more likely
to have a previous history of anti-social traits. Hafner and Boker concluded that
a tendency to aggressive behaviour is rooted in the personality and usually
manifests itself long before the onset of the mental disorder.
The study also pointed to particular clinical features which may be
associated with an increased propensity to violence, e.g., systematic delusions
of persecution in schizophrenic subjects when accompanied by the experience
of danger or threat to life, and delusions of jealousy.
The violent offenders with psychotic depression seemed to form a special
case in their series. In the main, attempted homicide, successful or otherwise,
was accompanied by attempted suicide. The authors were of the opinion that
the violence was closely associated with the psychotic depressive illness and was
not a reﬂection of pre-existing anti-social personality traits or aggressive patterns
of behaviour.
The second type of study on the probability of dangerous behaviour in the
mentally abnormal is to look at the frequency of assaults immediately prior to
and during admission to hospital. - There are very few studies on levels of
8 Mullen op. cit. p. 7.
,9 ibid p. 11.
'°ibid pp. 11, 12. I6.
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violence prior to admission. Those that have been done are in the main
retrospective studies and it is extremely difﬁcult to form conclusions on
retrospective studies of case records. One such study“ of 400 patients from New
Jersey reported that 12 per cent committed actual assaults prior to admission.
A study speciﬁcally of domestic violence prior to admission, reported fourteen
(23 per cent) of a group of sixty consecutive admissions had battered their
spouses. In another cohort of l 033 patients, 11 per cent had acts of violence
noted on their admission records. A highly selected group of ﬁfty-one disturbed
adolescents gave a ﬁgure of 66 per cent with histories of personal violence prior
to admission. A study of violence in 138 morbidly jealous subjects revealed that
over 50 per cent of the males and 40 per cent of the females had assaulted their
partners in the six months prior to admission. Two of the studies mentioned,
namely those on disturbed addlescents and on morbidly jealous patients, are
on highly speciﬁc populations. The other studies mentioned do not compare
rates of assaultive behaviour in their mentally ill group with rates of such
behaviour in matched control groups in the community who are not mentally
ill. Assaultive behaviour in the non-mentally ill community could have been
just as high. No valid conclusions can be drawn from such studies.
Studies on inpatients give greatly varied ﬁgures of violence ranging from
7 per cent of a chronic inpatient group in a three-month period to the ﬁndings
that serious violence is rare.
A number of authors have pointed to the risks of nursing staff being
assaulted—and psychiatrists are not exempt. Whether or not the violent
behaviour results from mental illness or an unsatisfactory hospital milieu or
atmosphere is a moot point. Certainly in one large English hospital violence
was lessened somewhat after the introduction of chlorpromazine, a major
tranquillizer, but it still continued. It did abateconsiderably, however, when
an open door policy was introduced and along with it, the application of the
therapeutic community philosophy.
Mullenl2 in his paper draws no particular conclusions from his review of
papers on pre and post admission violence, and from the data presented I am
also at a loss to do so.
He does point out, however, that there appears to be an increased risk of
assaultive behaviour amongst acutely disturbed and deluded schizophrenics,
among sufferers from acute brain syndromes in some studies; and he also points
to a positive correlation between youth and a history of previous violent acts
and assaultive behaviour.”
A third line of study is to look at mental abnormality among prison
inmates. The level of mental disorder among convicted prisoners depends on
how wide a deﬁnition of mental disorder is applied. When the deﬁnition
includes anti-social personality disorders or psychopathic disorders, a signiﬁcant
proportion of offenders fall within the category of mentally disordered. If mental
illness is more narrowly deﬁned and conﬁned to schizophrenia, paranoid states
and affective (pertaining to mood) disorders, the ﬁgures range from 2 per cent
.. ibid. p. |2.
'2 ibid. p. l l.
”(b/d. p. l3.
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to 8 per cent in various studies. Substance abusers (alcohol and drugs) and
personality disorders appear to form the bulk of offenders in many instances.
The studies of prisoners suggest that although a signiﬁcant proportion has
psychological and emotional problems of a type not infrequently managed by
psychiatrists in the community, there are relatively few with major mental
illness. The prison population is drawn in the main from economically, socially
and culturally deprived strata in society. The level of mental disorder in its
- broadest sense would be expected to be higher in this disordered group, but they
infrequently suffer from deﬁnable or diagnosable mental illness.
Mullen,” while indicating that studies on convicted felons do not support
the contention that mental illness makes a major contribution to crime in
general, points to differences when it comes to speciﬁc types of offences. He
points out that in the United Kingdom over the last decade, 30 per cent of those
charged with homicide have been deemed by the courts to be mentally
abnormal; and in the period of 1900 to 1949, 61 per cent of murder suspects
in the United Kingdom committed suicide or were found unﬁt to plead or not
guilty on the grounds of insanity, or were certiﬁed insane after trial. The
comparable ﬁgure for New Zealand between 1920 and 1955 was 59 per cent.
Thus in this most dangerous of all offences, murder, between 30 per cent and
60 per cent of the perpetrators could be classed as mentally disordered. Even
given that some of the suicides were not mentally ill and that the defence of
insanity may have been stretched somewhat to accommodate some unlikely
people it seems more than a possibility that seriously violent bahaviour may
be contributed to more frequently by the mentally ill.
Interim summary and comment
I would like to summarise some of the comments made up to this point,
then introduce some thoughts on the concept of mental disorder before looking
at the question of assessment or prediction of dangerousness.
The concept of dangerousness has been delineated as “a potential for
inﬂicting serious bodily harm on another”.'5 Political and religious ideologies
may be strong motivating factors in the genesis of dangerous behaviour. It is
best not to view dangerousness as a quality possessed by an individual.
Dangerous actions have complex origins which are caused by an interaction of
factors, some social, some related to habit and learning, others psychological,
and some medical, either physical or psychiatric.
In trying to answer the question “who are the dangerous?” it has been
noted that studies have been carried out on conviction rates for ex psychiatric
hospital patients, on assaultive behaviour of psychiatric patients both before and
during admission to hospital, and on mental disorder among convicted
prisoners.
Taken globally there appears to be no signiﬁcant evidence pointing to a
strong correlation between dangerousness and mental disorder but there does
'4 ibid. pp. 13. I4.
"5 Kozol 9101., op. cit. p. 372.
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appear to be an increased risk of assaultive behaviour amongst acutely disturbed
- and deluded schizophrenics and among sufferers of acute brain syndromes and
there is a positive correlation between assaultive behavior, youth and a history
of previous violent acts. These latter two correlations hold also for the
population in general. It also seems possible that seriously violent behaviour,
namely, that leading to homicide, may be contributed to more frequently by
the mentally ill.
The problem with many studies undertaken is that they metaphorically
lump together hot chillies, peaches, pineapples and lemons which while all are
derived from plant life assail the taste buds in different ways.
In botanical or zoological terms the class mental disorder encompasses
mental illness in its variety of forms, substance abuse, mental retardation or
developmental disability of mind, and personality disorders including anti-social
personality disorder (the aggressive psychopath) to.name just a few of its orders,
families, genera or species.
Our interest is in the mentally ill, not in the psychopath or the mentally
retarded, although we do have some concerns with the mentally retarded who
also develops mental illness, and in the psychopath in as much as it is relevant
to exclude mental illness in such a person who may have performed grossly anti-
social acts including rape and murder. It is unfortunate that many studies have
obscured matters by not conﬁning themselves to the issue that concerns us,
namely dangerousness potential in the mentally ill per se.
The Assessment of Dangerousness
While all professionals dealing with the mentally ill are concerned with the
question of dangerousness there are three major groups of people who under
the Mental Health Act 1983,-should have more than a nodding acquaintance
with this propensity—the magistrates, the Mental Health Review Tribunal and
the Patient Advocacy Service.
The Act spells out in s. 5 (l) (b) the dangerousness criteria for involuntary
detention of a mentally ill person and these should not be too difficult to apply
as the sub-paragraphs all refer to recent acts; though one could ask, “how recent
is recent?”
Assuming that the acts or conduct referred to are recent both at the time
of the Magistrate’s Inquiry under s. 88 and at the time of Determinations by
the Tribunal under s. 95 and s. 97, they probably cannot be regarded as recent
at the time of review by the Tribunal of many of the continued treatment and
informal patients under ss. 102 and 103 of the Act. Other factors have
intervened notably time, the effects of a management programme for the
patient, and the effects of the institutional setting. The Tribunal is faced with
the problem that a psychotic person with a history of violent assaultiveness may
harbour an extremely dangerous potential even if he is consistently docile in
an institutional setting”.
16I'bia’. p. 391.
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This particular aspect of assaultiveness is probably more relevant to the
Tribunal’s functions in the forensic part of the Act (Part VII ss. 1 17 (1) (b) (ii),
1 17 (3), 1 18 (1) (b) (ii) and 1 19 (3)) where it has to satisfy itself that the safety
of the public (or the patient) will not be seriously endangered by the patient’s
release.
Whatever the case, in review procedures one is moving further away in
time from a dangerous act committed by a patient whose compliance in an
institutional setting may tend to lead one to believe he will function in the same
non aggressive fashion in the outside community. The problem is one of
correctly predicting future dangerous behaviour if the interests of the public as
well as the patient are to be served.
The difﬁculties associated with this exercise have been pointed out already. .
Scott, in an article titled “Assessing Dangerousness in Criminals”'7, quotes
Steadman and Cocozza (1974) saying:
If we attempt to distinguish the potentially dangerous patient, we
double our error by identifying as dangerous all of a group of patients when
only one third of them will live up to those expectations.
To reach this conclusion Steadman and Cocozza followed-up almost 1,000
ex-patients. However, these supposedly dangerous patients were a group of
middle-aged people who had been hospitalised on average for 14 years many
having committed comparatively minor offences. Therefore, it may be unwise
to generalise their conclusions to all patients in all secure psychiatric facilities”.
I will not attempt to give a detailed account of examination procedures
undertaken to assess dangerousness but will refer to areas looked at by one
author. Scott'9 considers a series of factors and points out that there are no
direct indications of dangerousness and that each factor may become important
in the presence of other factors or may be neutralised by yet others. Facts are
collected under the following headings:
(1) The offence, covering detail of the behaviour, the degree of and more
importantly the quality of violence, disinhibiting factors such as
substance abuse, and the offender’s behaviour after the offence.
(2) Criminal record and past behaviour, past behaviour being the best
indicator of future behaviour.
(3) Personal data including sex, age, marital status, personality traits,
deceptiveness and transparency, jealousy, and other dangerous traits
such as pathological (paranoid) suspicion and sadomasochism.
(4) Historical data including childhood, “deprivation”, parent/child
relationships etc., history of mental or physical illness.
(5) Progress in custody or hospital which can be pro’gnostically useful, but
also misleading.
(6) After-care dealing with the subjects, plans or lack of them for life
outside the institutions, remembering that it is often unwise to return
offenders to the setting in which their problem arose.
'7 Scott, P. D., ‘Assessing Dangerousness in Criminals', Brit. J. Psychiat. (1977), 181, 127—142.
'8 Mullen, op. cit., p. 15.
- '9 Scott, op. cit., pp. 129—138.
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The data thus collected is analysed from as many theoretical standpoints
as possible, and motive has to be considered alongside other factors deduced
from the data, especially the current level of personality integration and the ease
with which regression under stress recurs.
To Scott20 there are two basic questions to be answered which are more
concerned with the future than with the current offence. First, is the person
capable of compassionate feelings; is he able to feel sympathy with the sort of
persons who may become his victims, or is he so egocentric or so indoctrinated
or inﬂuenced or damaged that such feelings are absent or lastingly obscured?
Unless there is some recognizable sympathy for others, and revulsion at causing
suffering, there is always a vulnerability to situational aggressive impulses which
are bound to recur. ‘
The second question to be answered is, “Is this person’s capacity to learn
by experience still intact?”
Scott points out that a single interview near the time of release by a
stranger is not a good basis, on its own, for assessing dangerousness. Most help
is to be got' from plodding through records, nurse’s notes and trial manuscripts
and talking to the staff who are in daily contact with the patient. It is generally
accepted that invOlvement with patients on a long-term basis is a sine qua non
for the assessment of dangerousness.
Such a luxury, if one may call it that, is not afforded the Tribunal, nor the
magistrates, nor the Patient Advocacy Service. The corollary to this is that much
homework needs to be done on individual cases, and modes of reliable
communication need to be set up to make available to these groups all relevant
information that will assist in decision making on the question of
dangerousness.
Conclusion
Straws show which way the current ﬂows. A few of these straws have been
mentioned in the body of this paper indicating that there may be subgroups
within the family called mental illness who may have a greater potential than
“average” citizens for inﬂicting serious bodily harm on another. I shall not
'summarise these here but simply express the hope that researchers in this area
can tease out and identify such possible subgroups in order that we can come
a little closer to accuracy in our predictions of dangerousness. In the meantime
we would be the greatest of fools to assume that all mentally ill are dangerous
or that mental illness in some instances does not precipitate dangerous
behaviour.
2" Ibid. p. I40.
 ‘ . '63
COMMENT ON PAPER BY I. WALLACH ENTITLED
“MENTAL HEALTH ADVOCACY IN NEW SOUTH WALES”
Dr M J. Saitisbury
I have thought long and hard about commenting on Mr Wallach’s paper
and would have preferred to have dischssed certain matters privately in the
interest of better understanding between lawyer and doctor. The paper, however,
is now a public document and I would be most remiss not to comment on it
publicly in order to clarify at least some points that are made.
Mr Wallach has demonstrated the role of the Mental Health Advocacy .
Service in protecting the legal rights of citizens who have psychiatric problems.
He quotes one case supporting his argument that “legal factors can act as
catalysts in speeding up the arrival of specialized and differentiated forms of
mental health care”. When this occurs it is to be applauded. There is another
side to this coin, however, and a number of my colleagues can quote cases where
they consider the intervention of legal factors have led to unfortunate outcomes.
No system is perfect and some doctors and psychiatrists no doubt have a lot to
learn about legal process and about how to present their evidence and
conclusions, necessarily based on probability, to the. black and white legal minds
of certain lawyers. The Department of Health is taking steps to rectify this
situation in public sector psychiatry.
The paper attacks the Department’s administrative procedures quoting as
a prime example a case (page 34) discharged by the Supreme Court as a result
of Mental Health Advocacy Service legal representation. There appeared to be
some urgency in having this case heard in the Supreme Court in spite of the
fact that it was known that the proclamation of Part VII of the Mental Health
Act 1983, was imminent and the Mental Health 4Rev1ew Tribunal would shortly
be operating. Mr Wallach states that this “case is based upon the Department’s
use of defective medical certiﬁcates in its use of s. 24.”.
The facts are that two Schedule III Certiﬁcates were completed by visiting
psychiatrists to the Prison Medical Service approximately two weeks before the
person was committed for trial. This rendered the certiﬁcates which were
otherwise competently executed invalid or defective Had the certiﬁcates been
written two weeks later I doubt whether the supreme Court would or could have
made the ﬁnding it was obliged to make in the given circumstances—that the
plaintiff had been unlawfully held and detained.
‘ While appreciating the importance of conforming to the letter of the law,
from a practical point of view, the date of writing the certiﬁcates made not a
scrap of difference to the management in hospital of this young patient.
There are a number of points in the speaker’s paper with which issue can
be taken, but I shall refer only to some comments made on Case 3 (page 33).
My comments do not reﬂect on the speaker any more than they would reﬂect
on the Director of the Legal Aid Commission who one presumes is ultimately
' responsible for what emanates from lawyers in his service.
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There are two references to the Authorized Ofﬁcer. The ﬁrst refers to two
recommendations being “forwarded to the Authorized Ofﬁcer under the Act”.
The second states, “Even more startling, is the fact that she has remained in
custody despite two speciﬁc recommendations not to do so (sic) made by the
hospital authorities to th_e authorized ofﬁcer” (my underlining).
The facts are that the ﬁrst recommendation was made to an authorized
ofﬁcer in 1982 and the second recommendation was made to a second
authorized ofﬁcer in 1984, the ﬁrst-mentioned authorized ofﬁcer having left the
Service in 1983. There are currently three psychiatrists appointed as authorised
ofﬁcers under the Mental Health Act 1958 and, since 1982 there have been ﬁve
different psychiatrists holding the ofﬁce of an authorized ofﬁcer at One time or
another as well as at least one non-psychiatrist appointed as an authorized
ofﬁcer with limited functions. Given these facts, one wonders why the paper
refers to “the authorized ofﬁcer”.
Of more importance than this failure to determine the true nature of
departmental appointments to the position of authorized ofﬁcer is the fact that
certain conclusions have been drawn that are not based on all the available facts.
The paper states the following in relation to recommendations made for
the removal of Case 3 from under the provisions of the forensic part of the
Mental Health Act 1958:
“the ﬁles do not reveal any action which may have been taken to effect
her discharge and placement in the community.” On the basis of this, criticism
is levelled at the authorized ofﬁcer.
The fact is that a second set of ﬁles on forensic patients is kept at Central
Administration of the Health Department under lock and key. These ﬁles have
been made available to other legal ofﬁcers on request where this is relevant and
proper.
I can assure you these are not kept secret. Ever since I have worked in the
Department of Health we have had a Director of State Psychiatric Services, we
have had Directors of Mental Health Services, we have had a string of people
who worked as Senior Specialists in Mental Health Services or Principal
Advisers, and now we have a Senior Specialist, Mental Health Services.
Throughout a whole string of years these ﬁles have been there. They are
necessary because these ofﬁcers have had to arrange for transfer of patients from
prison hospital and so forth, and they regularly reviewed them as part of their
administrative job with the Department. At the moment it is part of the job of
the Senior Specialist, Mental Health Services. Now, why they did not know
surprises me. The Ombudsman’s Ofﬁce is very much aware they are there. They
have looked at least one of them very closely. Other people doing reseach know
they are there. In fact one of the Ofﬁcial Visitors appointed under the Mental
Health Act has been using them to do a Ph.D. thesis. Now probably 98 per cent
of all the administrative material is in the patients’ ﬁles at Head Ofﬁce. In some
instances there may be a little bit more on the ﬁles in hospital. Maybe in these
particular instances that have been referred to there may not be sufﬁcient
evidence in the hospital ﬁles of the patients. There certainly is in the ﬁles in
Head Ofﬁce because copies of all authorizations in respect of patients and in
respect of their security within the hospital are kept on ﬁle in Head Ofﬁce. That
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is part ofthe job. So the clinical notes are available to the Mental Health
Advocacy Service bothin the patients’ ﬁles and, if they want to, in the ﬁles in
Head Ofﬁce. There is no cover up there.
Had the Mental Health Advocacy Service lawyer asked any of the current
authorized ofﬁcers, including the one working in Head Ofﬁce in another capacity
as well, I am sure that further information relevant to Case No'. 3 could have
been made available—information which shows clearly what further action was
taken by'the authorized officer in question. One cannot assume that the legal
oﬂ‘icer concerned would have altered his conclusions in the light of this further
'evidence, but the fact remains that either he, or the speaker (or both) has
publicly impugned the sound reputation of an officer of the Department of
Health without taking cognizance of all the available facts which were readily
available.
In passing, one would assume that Mr Wallach thought carefully about the
implications of s. 186 of the Mental Health Act 1983, dealing with disclosure
of information before describing Case No. 3.
 PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Dr M. J. Sainsbury
On re-reading my paper it appeared to me that in trying to deﬁne
dangerousness I had taken a leap from violence to dangerousness without
indicating what I saw as a connecting link. In casethe relationship between the
concepts of violence, an action, and dangerousness, a property or potential, have
been obscured I should like simply to say that in the context of the subject I
am addressing violence is the point at which the potential for inﬂicting serious
bodily harm on another is released or triggered and action results. Put simply
one might say violence is dangerousness in action.
The paper points out that it is best not to view dangerousness as a quality‘
possessed by an individual. A person who carries out dangerous actions in one
situation may not do so in, another. Indeed dangerous actions have complex
origins which are caused by an interaction of factors, some social, some related
to habitant learning, others psychological,'and some medical which can have a
bias either in physical or psychiatric disturbance.
In trying to answer the question “Who are the dangerous?”, the paper
describes three types of studies. It also points out the difﬁculty in drawing
conclusions from these studies. Taken globally there appears to be no signiﬁcant
evidence pointing to a strong correlation between dangerousness and mental
disorder, but there does appear to be an increased risk of assaultive behaviour
amongst acutely disturbed and deluded schizophrenics and amongst sufferers
from acute brain syndromes of whatever cause. There is also a positive
correlation between assaultive behaviour, youth, and a history of previous
violent acts. It also seems possible that seriously violent behaviour, namely that
leading to homicide, may be contributed to more frequently .by the mentally ill.
This is becoming more evident.
While I am aware that mOSt lawyers, my daughter included, just love to
get their teeth into case studies I have quite deliberately avoided describing
individual cases which frequently provide anecdotal material only, and have
chosen to draw from literature provided by world experts in the ﬁeld of forensic
psychiatry. One might add that this State has very little research material on
forensic psychiatry from which to draw and in my view there is a need to
seriously consider setting up a Chair of- Forensic Psychiatry in New South Wales
so that the many questions still unanswered can be addressed and psychiatrists
can be attracted into this important ﬁeld.
Lastly, the paper comments on the assessment of dangerousness both in
terms of the factors studied by the psychiatrists in coming to a conclusion and
in terms of the responsibility that the Mental Health Act 1983 places on the
Mental Health Review Tribunal, magistrates, and patients advocates.
It will have been noted that I have referred to the Patient Advocacy Service
when, in fact, I meant the Mental Health Advocacy Service. There are a number
of possible reasons for this and I will mention just a couple.
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Two or three years ago there appeared to me to be two distinct groups of
lawyers keen to take their place in the sun in what was then to be called the
Patient Advocacy Service, a service that was to look after the interests of people
who through disability required the type of assistance proposed. One particular
group of lawyers appears to have come out on top and at some stage the
originally talked about name disappeared to be replaced by the current title. In
view of my continuing use of the 01d terminology discerning clinicians in the
audience will undoubtedly be considered the possibility of “perseveration”
which is the abnormally persistent, repetition of the word, phrase, or sentence
possibly indicative of a dementing process. On the other hand, it could be a
Freudian slip based on the fact that I see the role of an advocacy service
representing people, in this instance patients or sufferers. I can understand a
Tribunal reviewing the mental health status of a person but for the life of me
ﬁnd it difﬁcult to comprehend how one can be an advocate for such a difﬁcult
concept to deﬁne as mental health.
It will be noted also that little reference has been made to female offenders.
This is not entirely due to male chauvinism or whatever term is applied to
sexism these days, but to the fact that most (if the research that I was able to
dig out deals with males and my limited work in the forensic sphere has been
predominately with males, my apologies One little sop to the ladies is a
statement that depressive homicide among women is twelve times that among
men according to West German ﬁgures. .
Mr Wallach’s paper coupled with my comments on it would suggest, and
this grieves me, that all is not well between psychiatrists and at least some
lawyers in the Mental Health Advocacy Service although they all appear to be
pretty well orchestrated. Unlike Mr Wallach I did not think it appropriate to
use my paper as a platform to beat another professional over the head—in his
case psychiatry, a profession that requires a minimum of twelve years training
at a postsecondary level, most of these years involving contact with people or
patients with their problems. I would however welcome the opportunity to
discuss the modus operandi of the current Mental Health Advocacy Service in
another place before an unbridgeable gap develops between the patients
advocacy service, the legitimate aims of which I fully support, and my
psychiatric colleagues working in the most difﬁcult area in medicine.
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DISCUSSION PAPER I
MENTAL HEALTH ACT 1983: SECTION 178 (2) (b) (iii)
Janet V. Coombs, B.A., LL.B.
Barrister at Law
I wish to raise the following issues as questions for the seiminar:
In New South Wales the Mental Health Act 1983, section 178 (2) (b) (iii)
has enacted that a tribunal be appointed with power, inter alia, to approve a
sterilization to which the patient is unable or unwilling to consent even where
this operation is not for the life or health of the patient.
Without such legislation the acts necessary for sterilization are certainly
an assault and when performed by a doctor for the purpose of sterilization
would constitute assault with the intent of occasioning serious bodily injury
which would involve a penalty of penal servitude for life.
The enactment of such a section in the legislation is contrary to the United
Nations declarations on the rights of mentally retarded persons and of disabled
persons and if inﬂicted on a child is contrary to the Declaration of the Rights
of the child. It is on contravention of Article 23 (2) of the United Nations
Convenant on Civil and Political Rights which entitles persons of marriageable
age to marry and found a family—impossible when the person has been
sterilized.
Mental patients may go into remission or be cured at any time.
Sterilization of imbeciles was one of the ﬁrst of the excesses of Nazi Germany.
Section 178 (2) (b) (iii) should be repealed and doctors warned against
performing such operations.
I noticed that one of the papers (Wallach: see pages 35-36) dealt with
sterilization and said that sterilization was usually sought for female patients
and that it was done basically for the convenience of those who had
management of the patients to make them easier to look after. That is one of
the reasons that my submission was put in, to say how important it was for
people to be aware of the proper medical ethic in this matter. Patients should
not be treated for the beneﬁt of other persons, they should be treated only for
their own beneﬁt and that, as far as sterilization was concerned, is a treatment '
which involves an assault, an assault occasioning grievous bodily harm if it has
not been done for the health of the patient. The doctors, and probably the
Tribunal considering such an application for such a treatment, should be very
aware that this is a criminal act that is being considered, it is well recognized
by International Law that people have a right to their bodily integrity and that
they should not be assaulted in this way. These are the matters that I wanted
to draw to the attention of this seminar because under the Mental Health Act
it is possible for applications to be made for these operations to be done even
without the consent of the patient, though one would say that such patients very
probably would not have the capacity to consent.
It is the seriousness of this matter which caused me to speak at this
seminar.
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DISCUSSION PAPER II
SECTION 178 (2) (b) (iii) IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
John Parnell, SM.
1927 ,
“We have seen more than once that the public Welfare may call upon the
best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon
those who already sap ‘the strength of the State for these lesser sacriﬁces,
often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being
swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world, if instead of
waiting to execute the degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve
for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unﬁt from
continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination
is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. Three generations of
imbeciles are enough”.'
1941
“Five others are stated to be totally useless, for racial and biological
reasons; one of these, Agnes Fiala, should be sterilized immediately, as the
young fellows in the camp are said to be already beginning to take an
interest in her. Also two of the boys should immediately be made incapable
of reproduction, one of them, Nikolaus Reizer, because he has tuberculosis,
and the other George Kuhn, because with his protruding ears and round
shoulders he makes an impression of degeneracy”.2
1986
Today, in the penumbra of Nuremberg, yet the glare of the pursuit of
Mengeles to the grave and Ronald Reagan’s side step of the-“DAS REICH”
burial ground at Bitteberg, we in Australia appear intent upon raising the
“Totenkopf” again by proposals in New South Wales and Victoria for. the
stated “welfare” of the mentally ill.
I refer to: ,
(1) The New South Wales Mental Health Act 1983, s. 178 (2) (b) (iii),
which permits involuntary sterilization and,
(2) The Victorian Guardianship Bill (still in the Parliament) which
provides, in addition, not only for involuntary abortion, but also
ﬁlching of non-regenerative tissue from the living. (Clauses 42 a, b.
c.) Leaving aside Criminal Law issues these measures appear
(a) repugnant to
(i) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 16 (1).
(ii) The United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Article 23 (2).
(iii) The Nascent Australian Bill of Rights Article 13—all of which
provide a right to marry and procreate without discrimination.
(iv) The Nuremburg Code of 19493.
(b) to provide a genocidal tool for- any authority so inclined. .
' Buck v Bell 274 US 200 (I927). .
2 Report to'Lebe‘sborn H_..Q Berlin 25.8.41 "Children ofthe SS' Corgi I977. _. _
' 3 Sir Ronald Wilson ‘Experimenting with Life and Law: The Impact of Human Rights on
Experimenting with Life’. Aust. Journal of Forensic Sciences, June 1985. Vol. 17, p. 61
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Transcending temporal endeavours moreover, the worth of man is not to
be gauged by handsomeness 0fcountenance, length of the throw or knowledge of
the Brownian theory.
On the practical side—
(a) The surgical acts necessary to compulsorily sterilize, leaving aside any
question of statutory defence, involve an assault“. What occurs is
probably a serious bodily injury and intent to act is not in issue.
Unless, therefore, the Tribunals’ approval to act can be stretched to
a statutory defence, the offence in s. 33—maliciously inﬂicting
grievous bodily harm with intent, punishable by penal servitude for
life, may be complete.
(b) As to abortion—without some speciﬁc statutory defence it is diﬂicult
to see how even the “Menhettit” ruling could save an accused.
(c) As to compulsory acquisition of organs a clear precise statutory
defence would again be necessary.
The paternalism which produced this “Jekyll and Hyde”5 outcome ought
to go back to the respective Parliaments for more considered debate.
I am ‘concerned that the matter of elective type surgery in s. 177 may be
forced upon patients on such vague grounds as “the interests of the patient or
other person”. One wonders what-the interests of other persons is doing in a
Mental Health Act, but it is there.
A direction is to be made on these grounds by a Tribunal or authorized
person, not subject to the laws of evidence or procedure, able to inform itself
from any source, and apparently on what has been said earlier, not liable by
statute in any event to give reasons. I feel that'this is just another case of
abdication of responsibility by the legislature. I spoke about this at a previous
seminaré, and it is a case where proper legislative guidelines are necessary and
if the Act has got to be amended then it will have to be amended in that regard.
4 Michael D. Bayles “Sterilisation of the Mentally Incompetent"‘ World Congress on Philosophy,
Family Law and Social Philosophy, Sydney—Canberra, l4—21. August 1977.
5 Advocate (Melbourne) 3-4-86, p. I.
6 Syd. Inst. Crim. Proc. No. 69 “Policing Public Order” p. 72.
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DISCUSSION PAPER III
DEFINITION OF A MENTALLY ILL PERSON
Dr James Durham
Director of Psychiatry,
St Vincent’s Hospital, Darlinghurst.
I wish to address the topic “Deﬁnition of a Mentally Ill Person”, and to
make certain points regarding the Mental Health Act 1958 and the Mental
Health Act 1983.
1. Mental Health Act 1958
(a) I recently applied for a magistrate’s order under s. 12 (9). The patient
presented was clearly mentally ill in a medical sense (this was not
disputed). In addition, evidence was tendered of his having made
threats of violence against a particular person and of his having
spoken of obtaining a ﬁrearm and shooting “all the people” in a
certain building. The patient lived in the open, had no income, but
obtained and prepared food from unknown sources; he was well-
nourished and healthy in appearance and sufﬁciently 'clothed; and he
claimed to be quite happy with this eccentric mode of existence. These
latter circumstances were held to show that he was‘not “incapable of
managing himself or his affairs”; and it was decided in consequence
that he could not satisfy the Act’s criteria of a “mentally ill person”.
The magistrate cited the ruling of Mr Justice Powell (PY vs RJS and
Others May 5—7 1982) according to which it appears that the words
“. . . and is for the time being incapable of managing himself or his
affairs . . .” constitute a separate and necessary condition or criterion
which must be satisﬁed in addition to the other criteria. Moreover,
in this interpretation, it seems that it must be additional in the sense
of “independently of anything implicit in the evidence of which he/
she may satisfy the other criteria”. In other words, this criterion may
be addressed ﬁrst; and if it can be shown that the patient is able, left
to himself, to satisfy his basic needs, and to safeguard his property,
if he has any, then there is no reason to consider whether he/she
satisﬁes any other criteria; thus evidence that he/she is both mentally
ill in the medical sense and dangerous to others becomes irrelevant.
So, at any rate, it was'held in this case; and a reading of Mr Justice
Powell’s judgment might be held to support this interpretation. But
this seems to mean that a person could be severely mentally ill in the
medical sense, and highly and immediately dangerousto others, yet
be not a “mentally ill person”. For example, a man might have gross
delusion of persecution and have made preparations to kill the person ‘
he imagines to be his persecutor, or have credibly threatened to do
so; but if it can be shown that he is well-provided for, cares for his
bodily well-being, and is shrewd in matters of business, the other
matters escape consideration altogether.
It is true that the Act, after specifying that the person must be in need
, of “care, treatment or control for his own good”, goes on “. . . and is
for the time being incapable of managing himself or his affairs . . .”,
thus logically imposing the latter as a further necessary condition. But
it obviously was not intended to lead to the absurd conclusion I have
just mentioned, and there. is not need for it to do so. In the foregoing
 (b)
example, it would be consistent with the Act to hold that if the person
had no insight—did not realize that he was mentally ill and
dangerous, sufﬁciently to submit to care, treatment or control—then
from these facts alone, he was “for the time being incapable . . .” etc.
For his affairs will soon take an unfortunate turn if he carries out his
plans or threats.
In other words, there is no need to hold that the question of capability
in the ordinary affairs of life must be settled independently of the
question, arising from other considerations, of the patients need for
treatment, etc. When these other questions do not arise, then of course
the ordinary criteria of capability—ability to obtain necessary food,
shelter, clothing, etc., to avoid common hazards, and to safeguard
one’s propertylwithin reason—are sufﬁcient. But if one is also mad
and dangerous, these ordinary criteria are no longer sufﬁcient.
Dementia and mental illness
I believe this subject will be fully dealt with by others.
2. Mental Health Act 1983 '
(a)
(b)
The most obvious of its many defects is surely the repeated occurrence
of “probable” and “probably” in Section 5. Unless otherwise speciﬁed,
this seems to mean “more probable (or probably) than not”, i.e., With
a probability greater than 0.5. But this seems to require acceptance
of a degree of danger which would not be tolerable in most instances,
and/or an unattainable degree of prognostic accuracy or conﬁdence.
It is also inﬂexible: a certain level of risk, or probability, of suicide
might have to be accepted in the case of an elderly, sick patient,
whereas the same risk would be much less tolerable in the case of a
young healthy person.
? Substitute for “probable” and “probably” the phrase “with a degree
of apparent probability which is deemed unacceptable in the
circumstances”.
A very serious deﬁciency is the denial of ECT, under s. 172, to
patients who are deemed incapable of giving informed consent, but
who are unlikely to die immediately if it is not given. This would
mean months of intolerable misery and distress for many melancholic
patients. The criteria for informed consent set out in s. 163 (4) are
not exhaustive and‘would not be held to be sufﬁcient alone. The
patient must, in order to be capable of giving informed consent, be
cognizant of the fact of his illness and of the beneﬁts to be derived,
as well as of the possible risks, from treatment. Many melancholic
patients are incapable of this, by reason of their illness, and yet are
quite willing to have the treatment.
The requirement of informed consent in such cases is_too strict.
Simple consent—unconstrained, of course, and backed by the
necessary medical evidence of its desirability—should be sufﬁcient.
(We are not here talking about ECT given against the will of the
patient, for which the stipulation that it must be life-saving is very
proper).
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Dr James Durham
First, I would like to comment on Dr Shea’s paper. I do not often ﬁnd
myself in disagreement with Dr Shea but I am violently in disagreement with
his proposal to deﬁne mental illness in terms of a list of diagnoses. I know Dr
Shea is well aware of some of the practical difﬁculties, 'such as that it may be
very obvious that somebody is mentally ill long before a diagnosis is available
and it may be urgent to do something about it. I think that making or providing
shall we say “catch all” terms, broad terms as Dr Shea says, really does away
with any merits that the original proposal has.
But I think there is a more important objection to it than that. In the
ordinary person’s mind there is a very clear idea of what he means by someone
who is mad or insane or as we now say “mentally ill”. It is a very robust idea
' which has not changed much across cultures or generations and I think it is a
safeguard, a civil liberties safeguard against abuse of mental health legislation.
You can stick a diagnosis on almost anybody, but a layman, a good lawyer or
somebody like that will soon see where this is different from saying that the
man is “mentally ill” or mad in the legal sense. In other words I disagree with
Dr Shea. I think mental illness, where it is a question of depriving somebody
of his liberty, that is, in some sort of legal context is really a lay or legal notion
rather than the medical one. Obviously doctors may be better at eliciting the
facts on which such a judgment is ﬁnally made but I think that in the last
analysis it has to be a layman or a lawyer who decides whether an individual
is mentally ill, and really the lawyers or laymen ought to have the last word as
to the deﬁnition. I realise that has not worked out very well so far but I think
that it should be corrected through the ordinary processes of appeal rather than
trying to wrest the notion of mental illness back into a purely medical
framework.
We have at the moment a very odd situation, if it is at all general and Dr
Shea tells me it is, that under the present Mental Health Act a person can
apparently be indisputably very mad and indisputably very dangerous but not
a “mentally ill person” if he is nevertheless apparently able to look after himself
in the ordinary matters of existence like obtaining suﬂﬁcient nourishment,
shelter, clothing, and is able to protect himself from common dangers. I think
this is a misreading of that section of the Act, which I think everyone will know
about, where it 'says: “. . . and is for the time being incapable of managing
himself and his affairs . . .”. Mr Justice Powell has read that as if it imposed a
completely independent criterion which the patient has to satisfy, i.e. that he
is incapable quite apart from the other criteria (which are very roughly of being
mentally ill in the medical sense and being either dangerous to himself or
others). I do not think that that is a necessary reading of that section because,
of course, in the case of an ordinary person the criterion of whether he is able
to look after himself might well be that he is able to provide himself with food
and clothing and protect himself from common dangers; but if he happens to
be also mentally ill and dangerous I think then that you can only say that he is
capable of managing himself and his affairs if he is also capable of saying: “Yes
I need to be looked after, I need some treatment”. Of course, in that case you ‘
do not need an order; but if he has not got so much insight I think that he does
then satisfy that third criterion.
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It has been held quite to the contrary in the case that we had recently at
St Vincent’s Hospital which I wrote up. There it was held that the criteria could
be tackled in any order you liked and if you could show that the man was ﬁt
and healthy and had a means of looking after himself in the ordinary way, then
the question whether he was mentally ill in the medical sense or dangerous did
not arise. I feel sure that this is wrong. I think that is does seem to follow from
Mr Justice Powell’s judgment in the case that I quoted and I would be interested
to hear what other people think about it.
Dr Peter Shea
Just a brief comment. I wanted to tell you that Jim Durham and I had a
very amicable conversation about this very issue and we have agreed to disagree
on this matter of deﬁning mental illness in the legislation.
The point that I made at the time of our conversation was in fact that in
every magistrate’s inquiry, in every Tribunal hearing, someone says “What is
this person’s diagnosis?” and so someone has to make a diagnosis. It happens
thousands and thousands of times every year and having made the diagnosis
someone says “What symptoms or signs etc. support this diagnosis, doctor?”
‘and the doctor has to give a list of symptoms and signs to support the diagnosis.
Now, if you can do this at a magistrate’s inquiry several times a year it strikes
me that we could do it in a sort of consensus fashion and put it into some
legislation or regulatory form.
I. Wallach
In relation to what Dr Durham said about the question of the deﬁnition
of mental illness I would agree with him that such a person as he mentioned
ought to be considered to come-within the deﬁnition of a mentally ill person
in the 'Act. I would disagree with Dr Durham in relation to the way he says
Justice Powell has interpreted the deﬁnition. What Justice Powell did say, in
the case PY v RJS and Others is that in relation to establishing the need of
treatment for the public beneﬁt that the question of a breach of the peace could
be used to establish that leg. I would also think that that same evidence would
also be sufﬁcient to establish the third leg, that of incapacity, as he pointed out.
I do not think that the case that he mentioned, if the case was reported
accurately as he said, would necessarily be outside that realm of the deﬁnition.
However, having got Dr Durham’s question in advance I very carefully checked
up with the solicitor who does our hearings at Caritas Centre, where Dr Durham
is based. In that particular case, as I understand it, there was very much an
issue of dangerousness being questioned before the magistrate and by the
magistrate. As I understand it the facts of the case differed substantially as
viewed by our solicitor and presumably by the magistrate as to the person’s
dangerousness. I would say that in the case that was raised by him there was a
serious conﬂict as to the facts, and a serious difference as to how the facts were
viewed rather than turning on a nice legal deﬁnition.
Chairman
I think it might be useful to note that we are considering in those remarks
of Dr Durham, Dr Shea and Mr Wallach the deﬁnition under the 1958 Act,
and not that under the 1983 Act which is not yet in operation.
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DISCUSSION PAPER IV
Edgar Freed, M.B.,, B.Ch., D.P.M., F.F.Psych.(S.A.), M.R.C.Psych.,
F.R.A.N.Z.C.P.
Staff Psychiatrist, St Vincent’s Hospital, Darlinghurst.
I wish to raise the following issues as queStions for the seminar:
1. A person may have been found not detainable as an involuntary
patient under the Mental Health Act. If such a person commits an act
of violence without any additional evidence of mental deterioration,
what avenues are there for the victim to:
(3) Lay a charge and, assuming that the evidence is forthcoming,
obtain a conviction, without the defendant being able to use as
a defence that he was mentally disturbed. This would be a
ludicrous no win situation for the victim as the defendant has
been excluded from involuntary detention in a mental hospital.
(b) Obtain a court order whereby the defendamt is ordered not to
harass the plaintiff in any way. To what extent would such an
order be, enforceable. Again there is the risk that the mentally ill
', person may have it both ways; he or his legal advocate will have
persuaded the magistrate at the committal hearing under the
Mental Health Act that he was not a mentally ill person within
the meaning of the Act, and at the same time may persuade a
civil or criminal court that he is not responaible for his actions
ashe did not know what he was doing by virtue of mental illness.
(c) What avenues are open for a victim to obtain compensation if
the victim was the subject of an attack by a mentally distrubed
person who has been found to be not detainable as an
involuntary patient under the Mental Health Act, but who claims
insanity or diminished responsibility as a defense.
2. The above issues address the question of legal redress that the victim
of the actions of a mentally disturbed person might wish to pursue. I
would ask the learned speakers at the seminar what form of political
action they would recommend as being either opportune and/or
effective if the situation arose where a victim felt that the present legal
system was not effective in protecting him or her from assault, threats
of assault, or other harassment.
DISCUSSION
 
N. Harrison
With reference to Dr Freed’s paper, it is very hard to comment on what
you might call hypothetical situations. In reading the contribution as it is written
I thought to myself: Well, it may be the victim has to lay charges, it may be
more likely the police would lay a charge on behalf of the victim if there was
an assault depending on what degree of mental disturbance the accused may
have, there may be an issue of his ﬁtness to plead, or he may have a defence
of mental illness or diminished responsibility depending on the nature of the
charge. As far as the harassment is concerned the victim would have rights to
seek a restraining order in the way of apprehended violence or domestic
violence and so far as the question of compensation is concerned if there was
in fact no conviction of the accused person the victim would never the less have
rights under the ex gratia scheme in Criminal Injuries Compensation Act. I am
not sure that answers the questions or raises more problems.
I. Wallach
Under the Crimes Mental Disorder (Amendment) Act which will add
provisions to the Crimes Act, sections 423w to Y, magistrates in summary
proceedings, and it speciﬁcally excludes committal proceedings, will have a
discretion to deal with people who come before them on criminal charges by
sending the person for assessment to a psychiatric hospital. If six months elapses
from the time of the charge then it is deemed that the charge will be dismissed.
On the other hand where the proceedings do come back to court, prior to the
end of that six months period, the magistrate is directed to take into account
any time spent receiving treatment in a psychiatric hospital. Those sections I
think will give an important discretion to magistrates, it will also I think seek
to emphasise the nature of some of the offences or some of the proceedings
which come before them. I certainly applaud those sections.
Dr Yolande Lucire, Psychiatrist
I have two questions, maybe three. The ﬁrst one is this. Is it true that a
large sum of money has been allocated to the Mental Health Advocacy Service?
Would that service be prepared to disclose at this forum how much that money
is? Will the service be writing in Annual Report of the Legal Aid Commission
on the expenditure of such money? And does the service actually follow up the
clients for whom it has been successful? That is my ﬁrst question.
Chairman
Forgive me for saying so but I thought that was all three. Perhaps Mr
Wallach might respond.
I. Wallach
I take it that the series of questions referred to the Mental Health Advocacy
Service. When I was writing a few comments on what Dr Sainsbury was saying
in relation to alleged personal attacks, the next comment I had written, rather
sarcastically I might add, in large letters was “MOSCOW GOLD?” It now seems
that the question of “Moscow gold” has in fact reared its ugly head. I suppose
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I should reply in the same terms as our former Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser
did, that possibly we should all begin by putting it under the bed. However I
will not say that. As far as the money allocated to the Mental Health Advocacy
Service is concerned I cannot tell the doctor the complete budget. It is allocated
to us as part of the Legal Aid Commission’s funding and I think the proper
course would be to have the Director or the Director’s nominee answer that
question. I do not consider myself qualiﬁed to do so and I do not think I have
the knowledge to do so.
The question in relation to an Annual Report on expenditure I can only
say again on the question of actual expenditure I do not know, but the Legal
Aid Commission does publish an Annual Report as does almost every other
government agency, and the Mental Health Advocacy Service does have a
section in that Report in which we report on our activities during the past year.
In relation to follow up, we do carry out some follow up. I think that we
carry out as much follow up as is possible under the circumstances. I think it
is unfortunate to raise this presumably within the context of suggesting that we
appear for our clients and then dump them. If that is the case I think it is doing
everyone concerned a disservice. I would like to at least think that everyone
» involved in this business, both medical and legal people, do have the interests
of their patients and of their clients at heart. I do not believe that anybody in
this game deliberately dumps a client or a patient.
T. Kelly, Director, Legal Aid Commission
The ﬁgures are in the Annual Report. I cannot give you a ﬁgure for this
year because the matter is not up and running, we are still waiting on much of
the Act to be proclaimed. If it ﬁnally gets going it will be around the $1,000,000
mark.
Dr Lucire
Thank you very much. I have another question: When will ethicists and
philosophers be involved and be' available as consultants to both psychiatrists
and lawyers who work in this ﬁeld to provide an ethical and philosophical
structure against which the present situation can be evaluated from the point
of view of what is in the best interests of the patient? I think that we have to
start off with a situation as we have with the custody of children in the Family
Law Act. We have to start off from the position of what is in the best interests
of this patient and the adversary‘system does not appear to do that.
I am aware that in the United States ethicists and philosophers are used
in this way. I think they should be available to lawyers and doctors to consult
as part of the staff of perhaps the hospital or the Legal Services Commission.
Dr P. Shea
Just a passing comment to Tom Kelly. My Arts Major happened to be in
philosophy, so I fully support Dr Lucire. Perhaps the million dollars or so could
be spent on providing people who could give a sound philosophical basis to
what goes on, rather that all of us depending upon the whims of particular
parties. ‘
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I. Wallach
The major point which is raised by Dr Lucire in that last question did
relate to that vexed phrase, “the best interests of the patient”. Now the real
crux of the entire issue is who decides what are the best interests of the patients.
That is the reason why it is not the person, or the organization wishing to detain
the patient which is left with the decision as to whether or not a person is to
be detained. Rather a magistrate, an outsider, is brought in to make the
decision. Similarly the patient himself or herself obviously has to be able to
have the rights to state what in his or her opinion are in his or her own best
interests. Now, if we could simply switch on a computer or a machine which
would tell everybody what is the best interests in every possible situation, it
may well be that there would be no need for the system. However, the real issue
is rather that all people involved in this business have their own view of what
the best interests of the patient are and that is the real difﬁculty.
Dr Lucire
I would like to answer Mr Wallach. I am not saying that anyone of us can
determine what is in the best interests of the patients but what we can have is
a theoretical structure as to what questions ought to be asked to determine the
best interests of the patient. The information that we allow into the discussion
is what determines its outcome and in fact what we need is somebody there
who is able to ask each of us, doctors and lawyers, a lot of questions that a lot
of us are not thinking about. So I am suggesting a change of criteria, not at the
legal level, but at the informal level.
My third question is a bit tricky I suppose. Many symptoms of mental
illness are negative ones. These are lack of certain capacities, lack of the capacity
to work, lack of the capacity to judge, lack of the capacity to maintain a stream
of thought, and lack of the capacity to behave appropriately. How does the
lawyer know that the person from whom they are taking instructions has the
capacity to instruct?
I. Wallach
The lawyer when acting for people in either magistrates’ hearings or before
the Tribunal obviously does have a difﬁcult task. Dr Lucire has raised a most
legitimate point and one which is actually in the foreground of any lawyer’s
mind when taking instructions. It is certainly one that we are aware of. What
we have to do, I think, is to hear what it is that our client is telling us, bring
to that person’s attention any problems that we can see, advise them accordingly
and then assist that person in taking up some of that advice. In a lot of other
cases what will occur, for example, is that we will in fact call our own expert
witnesses on behalf of the the person facing the Tribunal or the magistrate. The
point that is often missed by many critics of the system is that we, as the
patient’s advocate, often bring in independent experts to assist us in coming to
any conclusions regarding advice we might give our client and also the course
which we might adopt before the relevant Tribunal. Now, there is very much a
mistaken attitude that lawyers seen to make some value judgement or snap
judgement in some other way and simply go off and take that course. What is
often missed is the fact that advocates, solicitors of the Mental Health Advocacy
Service, do in fact employ their own expert evidence. For example, whenever
any of our solicitors on behalf of a client does take up a matter on appeal to
the Supreme Court we will always have the evidence and assistance of an expert
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witness. Very often this is an independent psychiatrist, or a social worker and
other expert witness. It is not the fact that we go off and make a lot of these
judgements on our own—we get assistance.
N. A. Harrison
I think in writing my paper I threw up a lot of questions which are still
all in mid air and have not been answered. On pages 20 and 21 I raised that
particular point as to how the advocate is able to receive instructions. I did not
come up with an answer unfortunately.
Dr D. Russell, General Philosophy Department, Sydney University.
I did not really come to speak about Dr Lucire’s comment. I do not think
philosophers do have a role1n these hearings, and as things are presently being
conducted I am really pleased about the Mental Health Advocacy Service—how
it has been set up and how it is running. That is not to say it will always be
wonderful, but at the moment I think it is very good. I think that these are
legal matters that should be faced legally and not informally, as Dr Lucire said.
I think that what Mr Wallach said about hearing what it is that the client is
telling is a very good thing to go by because I think it is primarily the client,
the patient, who should be expressing what they wishto do and should be heard.
The point I really wanted to comment on was the definition of mental
illness in the new Act and what Dr Shea said about extending the clause relating
to social and financial harm to other types of mental illness apart from anything
to do with manic depression. I think this would be a terrible step backwards. I
think it would open up a whole lot of woolly indeterminate issues that are still
prevalent in the old Act. It would be getting back to something like the‘‘patient
needs care, treatment and control for their own good”. The great advantage of
the 1983 Act is that it has tried to narrow the definition for committal by
keeping it basically in terms of actual or potential physical harm to self or
others. I think to try once again to broaden that would be a terrible step
backwards.
Finally I would just like to ask if any members of the panel could tell us
when the section relating to mental illness of the new Act will be proclaimed?
Dr P. Shea
I have heard the same comment many times before.
The phrase is “serious ﬁnancial harm or harm to his or her reputation and
standing in the community”. It spells out fairly speciﬁcally in the Act exactly
what that phrase means. I think the term “serious” is important. It does not
just imply anybody who is suffering from ﬁnancial or social harm could be
included. .
The important point I-was making, and I made it in my paper as well, is
that when you have a person who is mentally ill and who requires treatment
the aim is to get them into treatment. Once they are in treatment you can
introduce a whole series of appropriate safeguards to ensure that that treatment
is not prolonged beyond the time the person should be in'hospital.
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I think in the new Mental Health Act we have all those safeguards. The
point I was making, and I am sure Dr Russell would appreciate this, is that it
is logically inconsistent to have that phrase for one particular type of mental
illness when, in fact, the degree of ﬁnancial and social harm that can occur with
schizophrenia and depression can be every bit as great or even more so than in
the case of a person in the manic phase of manic depressive illness.
Dr Sainsbury
Just in answer to the question as to when Part V of the Act is being
Proclaimed, that is the Minister’s perogative.
Doug Humphreys, Solicitor, Mental Health Advocacy Service
I would like to take issue with a couple of comments made by Dr Sainsbury
in his second paper, the comment on the paper byAMr Wallach. ‘
On page 63 he refers to a matter which was taken up in the Supreme Court.
He makes a comment:
While appreciating the importance of conforming to the letter of the
law, from a practical point of view, the date of the writing of the certiﬁcate
made not a scrap of difference to the management in hospital of this young
patient. ,
Firstly I would like to quote from a paper that was given by Sue Schreiner
to a Magistrates’ Conference some years ago and she was then dealing with the
defective documents which are placed before magistrates in mental health
inquiries in hospitals and she said there:
The consequences of the deprivation of liberty cannot be too seriously
stressed. The questions that arise are not merely matters for lawyers to
argue about. They are questions involving the most fundamental human
right of all, mainly the right to one’s liberty. The only other occasion when
I citizens under our system of justice are deprived of their liberty is after
conviction by a court for a criminal offence after trial, open to public
scrutiny which embodies in'it the safeguards to ensure that the accused is
properly tried and convicted, and sentenced.
She then goes on to talk about the documents that she has seen in
magistrate’s inquiries and she says later on:
It is with regret that I ﬁnd it necessary to say that in many cases those
documents are seriously and inexcusably defective. It often appears at
inquiries that certain medical practitioners have taken the view that their
decisions are not to be questioned, that they should not be subject to any
scrutiny, and that the deprivation of the person’s liberty is something that
lawyers take too seriously and argue about unnecessarily. .
In view of the fact that Dr Sainsbury said it did not make a scrap of
difference as to how this young man was treated I think I should point out ﬁrst
of all that he had been in custody for some number of years and this included
the number of years after the charges for which he was made a forensic patient
had in fact been No Billed or dropped by the Attorney-General, and he was
still being held as a forensic patient. Secondly as the result of the action in the
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Supreme Court which declared he had been unlawfully detained since 1983 he
. was discharged from the intermediate security ward, the forensic ward at
Morisset, he was transferred to another hospital in an open ward, he also had
his pension restored to him. Now if that is not a scrap of difference I am sorry
I do not know what it is“
Dr Sainsbury
Thank you Mr Humphreys. I am very muchtaware of Sue Schreiner’s
paper, and I know that numbers of certiﬁcates that have been written in the
past could stand a fair bit of improvement. With this patient there were
difﬁculties with section 24, which you well understand and I think it is a thing
that we cannot enter into here. It was One of the reasons why changes were made
to the .1983 Act, and eVen though the patient is ‘No Billed’ it is still a matter
for debate. I am not a lawyer, and I will not enter into that but, it is a big
problem. That particular patient went through a process of rehabilitation as far '
as one can in a limited number of wards in the particular hospital to which he
had been admitted. He used to workin the industrial rehabilitation unit and
when'his condition warranted it he was given quite great freedom within that
situation. If his condition deteriorated, and it did ﬂuctuate, one had to exercise
a reasonable amount of control in the matter. The question of his pension is
an unfortunate Social Security matter that is going to be reviewed by the Social
Security Department of the Commonwealth. We ‘feel a lot of our forensic
patients were very hardly done by through that Act of the Commonwealth. I
do not think I need to say any more but still I am learning, you see.
Dr P. Shea
I will only add to what Mr Humphreys said in this sense, that clearly the _
action taken on behalf of this man did improve his condition and his immediate
environment signiﬁcantly. When you say, as Dr Sainsbury says, as the result of
a long process of rehabilitation, it is remarkable and coincidental the actual
move occurred within a matter of days after his appearance in the Supreme
Court and the action taken on his behalf.
Dr Sainsbury I ,
I have not seen him since to know what the situation is at the moment.
You may have knowledge that I do not have..
Dr P. Stanﬁeld
Regarding that patient, (I think we have the same patient in mind), he is
being re-assessed at that hospital and thought to be unwell enough not to be in
an open ward. In fact, he has not been in an open ward and remains in a closed
ward and we think that his future treatment certainly in the immediate and
medium term will require him being in a closed ward.
Dr Graham Edwards, Psychiatrist
I would just like to make some brief comment on my friend Peter Shea’s
paper and give some background of the original committee looking at that area.
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One of the things that we actually ﬁrst did in those early days was to draw
up huge lists of mental illness, much along the lines Peter Shea suggested, and
realized that that would really make it very broad and impractical. The thrust
of that legislation which appears to be eventually coming assists with the matter
that mental illness is very much a matter for psychiatrists to determine, but the
accessory criteria of dangerousness itself and others may need ampliﬁcation
which appears to be the current sort of emphasis.
I would like to emphasise one thing that Peter Shea did raise in his paper
that could only have been a drafting oversight—omitting toxic psychosis from
the Act. One can hardly have parliamentarians and others under the inﬂuence
of LSD jumping off ledges and I hope they will amend that.
One ﬁnal comment on Mr Wallach’s paper. I think the original members
of that committee would be quite delighted to see at this stage what looks like
a professional Mental Health Advocacy Service to be developing. Even though
controversial in some ways as long as it is properly funded and staffed it should
have an important role to play.
Dr P. Shea
Five years ago I would not have said what I am saying today. Probably
two years ago I would not have said what I am saying today. I am saying we
need the deﬁnitions now because of the altered circumstances and the way that .
things are being dealt with. I do not like using labels as I mentioned. I think
they are hopeless, but I think they are being forced upon us by other people
and other circumstances. The best we can do is come to some agreement which
particular labels mean mental illness for the purpose of the legislation.
Anne Newham, Association of the Relatives and Friends of the Mentally Ill.
I would like to talk about the relatives’ points of view because in this
process with the Tribunals the relatives do not have a legal representative. I
am afraid they are very much subject to stress and harassment by the person
who is mentally ill, and I would like to ask what process of law is really going
to help these people because under existing legislation (and I would say that
people have been acting as though the 1983 Act is in place for three years now
even though it is in fact not) it is very difﬁcult to get a Restraining Order that
is effective? It will actually work on a person who is in a very demented state
so that the people are still at grave risk. I know of a case where a policeman
had to be stationed at a woman’s house for two nights running when she was
under extreme stress from some act of provocation from the husband who was
not living with her. But also I feel that the Apprehended Violence Orders fall
down, in fact they do not work, where a person has got access to guns and other
instruments. Assault charges do not work because the person who is mentally
ill does not turn up to court. I would like to know what redress people do have
because people are not being committed under this Act, or under the new Act,
at the moment for those acts of violence and dangerousness. Through the 24-
hour support line we hear of these cases where people are very very stressed
and under real danger in many instances.
N. A. Harrison
I will go first and decline. I do not know that answer unfortunately as my
paper indicates. My expertise is really in the area of ﬁtness to be tried and the
consequences therefrom and not the earlier stage as to what happens before the
patient reaches that point in the criminal process.
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I. Wallach
I would agree with the general point of view expressed. There are a hell of
'a lot of difﬁculties encountered by the families of those people whom I see and
have represented who are presented before a magistrate in hospitals. Very often
it is the family of the person involved who will be ultimately the last support
for that person and I agree certainly that those people do need a lot of support.
The situation cannot just be answered by legal measures. I would think there
are two things involved. First, there needs to be a real effort both in terms of
man power and money into the extension of community treatment services as
opposed to what Dr Shea has called community treatment orders. I would make
that distinction very strongly. I would think community treatment services are
essential and they must be built where they are needed. I can only refer you to
the beginning of my paper where I expressed the opinion that where police are
necessary to protect people or where there is a real risk of violence including
the use of ﬁrearms, quite clearly, in my opinion, that person would come within
the deﬁnition of “a mentally ill” person both under the existing Act and
certainly when the deﬁnition under the 1983 Act comes in.
The question of exactly how that person is to be brought into a hospital
under those extreme circumstances is a very difficult one, and I would think
involves as much again the question of community treatment and community
health personnel and not just lawyers. One solution is to extend and increase
the education of doctors involved in the ﬁeld so that they are better aware of
the legal provisions of both the existing Act and the new Act which is yet to
come in.
Dr Sainsbury
I have the greatest of sympathy for people who are in the position of Mrs
Newham and those people who are tied up with the Association of the Relatives
and Friends of the Mentally 111. I have quite a deal to do with them in terms
of crisis services and services in the community. Indeed we have nine crisis
teams in the State covering 20 per cent of the population at this moment which
is not enough, but I just wonder with all this how do you provide support? I
would ask Mr Wallach how do you support the mother in the house where the
child says “I am going to do you in Mum”. These are some of the problems,
and, in fact, many of the relatives have very strong feelings that if they go to a
magistrate’s hearing they feel that their voices are not really heard. They are
the people who first know that something is going to go wrong. They can pick
it up probably days or even weeks before that their child is going to become
assaultive but it seems to me that until the child becomes assaultive, then
nothing can be done. The families of these patients, particularly the sufferers
from schizophrenia, are in a very invidious situation, and I have a great deal
of sympathy for Mrs Newham.
Anne Newham
It is really the relatives who need the sympathy. I would just like to add a
comment on the matter of community services. I think they are marvellous and
where they are provided they are very effective in dealing with these situations,
but where that particular person really lacks insight into their condition, denies
the need for any treatment, and in fact refuses to have any, what recourse do
the community treatmentpeople have then, in that instance?
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I. Wallach
You are asking me to draft a legislative provision which will be an effective
magic wand to wave over a problem which is really difficult, which is vexed,
and which is obviously as sensitive as you have made out. As I said earlier I
do not think that there is a magic legislative provision which you can use to
cure all those problems but I would think that that attitude is part of the
problem. Very often, as Dr Shea pointed out in his paper, he would support
the idea of a community treatment order. In my mind that is similar to what
you are asking for, but the real problem is that there is no point bringing in a
system of community treatment orders unless you have in place ﬁrst a
comprehensive system of community treatment which can back up those orders.
That is really what you are talking about. I think to talk about bringing in
legislative provisions rather than the actual services that are needed in really
putting the cart before the horse. I personally would think that trying to lobby
and campaign for those sorts of resources would by far take priority over asking
for legal provisions to coerce people into getting treatment which may not be
available. After all, I think Dr Sainsbury has said that those services as yet cover
only 20 per cent of the population. I think that it would be in the interests of
A.R.F.M.I. and everyone here to try and get the extension of those community
services to 60 or 80 per cent, if not 100 per cent, of the population.
Anne Newham
Yes, I agree with you and that is something we are doing.
John Stratton, Mental Health Advocacy Service
I have got a question for Dr Shea about the vexed question of senile
dementia. Would you agree that admitting someone with senile dementia to a
large scale psychiatric hospital is likely to be the worst setting for their
treatment, and that studies show that their conditions is likely to deteriorate
after they are admitted to such an institution? It was a ﬁnding of the Richmond
Report that it was far better to deal with people suffering from senile dementia
in any setting other than a large-scale psychiatric institution. It is really not good
enough for people from the Health Department to say: “Well, there is really
nowhere else for these people to go,” when the Health Department is not
implementing the recommendations of the Richmond Report in providing some
other place where people suffering from senile dementia can be housed.
Dr Peter Shea
It is a loaded question. I would not like to comment on the actions of the
Health Department. I did write a paper some years ago in which I pointed out
very clearly that in my opinion the best place for anybody to have treatment is
where they live and work rather than in a hospital setting, and I still hold by
that belief. I think that if we had the resources the ideal place to begin both
assessment and treatment is as far away from hospital as you can possibly get.
All I am suggesting is that we do not have anything like those services for people
who are old and who have a multiplicity of social, psychological and physical
problems. So in one sense I am agreeing with you. I agree if we had those
services the best place to start would be the person’s own home in an
environment with which they are familiar. Unfortunately we do not have those
services and we do have to assess people. So in the meantime, in the absence
of any alternatives, I have suggested dementia should be considered a mental
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illness for the purpose of ensuring assessment can be carried out at least
somewhere.
John Stratton
But that means the assessment will take place in the hospital after they
have already been taken out of their homes.
Dr Peter Shea
Yes, that is correct.
John Stratton
And it is a self-fulﬁlling prophesy.
Dr Peter Shea
Yes, it is to some extent. The same thing applies to any patient who is
taken away from their home setting whether they are schizophrenic, depressed,
or manic, 6r anything. I will not extend this argument but by the same token
any person going into a professional setting is disadvantaged, whether it is a
lawyer’s ofﬁce or a doctor’s ofﬁce.
Dr B. Draper, Psychiatrist
. I specialise in health care of the elderly and I totally agree that the best
setting for health care of any person is in the home or in the immediate
environment. However, with dementia now seeming to be an exclusion under
the new Act as a mental illness, we have a problem because, unfortunately, some
patients with dementia become extremely violent, and I mean violence at the
level of causing quite a degree of bodily harm. We have the problem where there
is no safe place these people can be acutely looked after besides psychiatric
hospitals. It is all very well to say that it is due to an organic condition and
therefore not mental illness, but the reality is that these people are very
disordered and they cause their carers a great number of problems.
I believe it is a rather silly situation where we base the definition of mental
illness on exclusions such as organic disorder because it does not reach the crux
of the matter. The crux of the matter is “Is this person regarded in some way
by society as being mad or insane?” It does not matter whether it is organic'or
not, that is irrelevant. The relevance is, as we have been saying earlier, whether
the lay person believes this person is in some way insane. That is the basis that
we should look at. If we are going to say that demented people cannot be treated
involuntarily simply because they have an organic disorder, then I tell you what
we have rather a big problem on our hands because the number of demented
people that we are going to have in this society in the next 10 to 20 years is
escalating. The big problem is that while it is only a few demented people who
are violent or unable to be looked after in institutions for other reasons, all of
our community services will be taken up with them—and ineﬁ'ectively at that—
at the expense of the majority.
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Dr Peter Shea
Just a brief correction. Under the new Act dementia from drugs and alcohol
is included as a mental illness under s. 53. It is under the present Act that it is
excluded following Mr Powell’s decisions to that effect. I assume if dementia
from drugs and alcohol is included as a mental illness then you must include
other forms of dementia as well unless the Act is changed. I cannot see how it
can apply to one and not apply to the other.
I. Wallach
Dr Shea is talking about 5. 5 of the 1983 Act'which, of course, as we keep
on saying is yet to come into operation. He is talking about in particular sub-
section (2) and sub-section (3). Sub-section (2) lists a number of conditions to
which the preamable states “a person is not a mentally ill person by reason only
of any one of more of the following” and, of course, included in that list are
references to developmental disability of the mind and taking of drugs including
alcohol. Sub-section (3) is what Dr Shea uses to. bring this deﬁnition of dementia
and other similar organically caused conditions within the deﬁnition. It states
that nothing in sub-section (2) (which is that long list) “prevents in relation to
a person whotakes or has taken drugs the serious and permanent physiological
bio-chemical or psychological effects of drug taking from being regarded as an
indication that the person is mentally ill”. Now try and break that down. It is
a reference basically to that prior sub-section which is itself effectively an
exclusionary clause on the original section which is sub-section ('1) and that
section effectively still retains the basic scheme of the 1958 Act, which still
requires this presence of mental illness. I do not think that sub-sections (2) and
(3) which are basically exclusionary clauses enable the conditions to clear that
hurdle. In the ﬁrst place it still has to be a mental illness that we are talking
about and of course the Supreme Court has said that the condition of senile
arterioselerotic dementia itself is not a mental illness. Now, given the fact that
the condition of senile dementia would not come within the meaning of mental
illness in sub-section (1) in the first place I do not see how that defect can be
cured by exclusionary clauses referring to the same concept. If a person is not
mentally ill in the first place then merely because of what is said in sub-sections
(2) and (3) I do not think that the problem can be cured. '
Dr Peter Shea
This is a matter that Mr Wallach and I will be arguing before the Court
of Appeal shortly I hope. My point was that historically if you go back to the
way the Act was developed, and if you look at the 1982 Bill, and if you look
at the Cabinet Minutes and so on, you will find that what I said is correct.
I. Wallach
Well, on that note I would not dare contradict Dr Shea. I withdraw
everything I said! ‘
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Chairman
One thing I find intriguing about this whole question about arteriosclerotic
dementia not being a mental illness is that I seem to recall in my days as a
Crown Prosecutor being ﬁrmly convinced that there was solid authority for it
being regarded as a disease of the mind for the purposes of the M’Naghten
Rules. It seems to me extraordinary that we should have a different notion of
mental illness to disease of the mind. Indeed I seem to recall also Mr Justice
Powell deﬁned mental illness in terms of a disease of the mind and I also seem
to recall that none of these decisions which recognize arteriosclerotic dementia,
i.e., an organically caused condition, as a disease of the mind were cited or if
they were cited they certainly weren’t referred to by him in any of his decisions
relating to this question.
Peter Brain, Psychologist
I am a community-based clinical psychologist, as well as a part-time third
year law student at Sydney University. But it is in a third capacity I Wish to
make a comment. The debate has moved (in considerably from the point where
I would have liked to have commented, particularly the representative from
A.R.F.M.I. talking about community services and the services they provide.
It is in the capacity as Union delegate that I wish to make a brief industrial
political statement. In the Southern Metropolitan Region where I work, from
1981 to 1986 there was a 23 per cent reduction in community-based mental
health workers. In the light of the Richmond Report and staff that have been
appointed since then under the Richmond Programme, the total reduction after
those people had been added in is now 8 per cent which demonstrates to me
the commitment of the government generally to providing these sort of services
in the community for these patients.
I think that the government has to consider what many of the ramiﬁcations
are going to be with the Mental Health Act coming into effect and despite, some
of the comments in the papers at this seminar, people should realize that many
of the community facilities are acting in the spirit of the Act in the way they
assess people, in the way they Schedule people and put them in hospital, and
direct them towards hospital. At the moment it is these facilities that are bearing
the brunt of managing difﬁcult patients.
Matthew White, Law Student, Sydney University
As we are all aware under the Richmond Scheme the government’s policy
is to move people out of institutions and into the community, usually into
community houses. The people that cannot be moved out presumably are kept
in the institutions and I can give an example of this from my local area.
Morisset Hospital which is a Fifth Schedule system hospital in the Hunter
Valley is slowly being closed down. The patients which cannot be put out into
the community are being put into Stockton Hospital which is already terribly
overcrowded. It has something like 500 beds. When Morisset will be closed
down it is estimated there may be up to 850 beds needed in Stockton Hospital.
The point I want to make is that when the new deﬁnition of mental illness
comes into play, which is very heavily based on harm to other people,
presumably the people who are going to be involuntarily incarcerated under that ‘
system will not be moved out into the community under the Richmond Scheme.
Could I ask Dr Sainsbury where will they be put if the Fifth Schedule system
is already overcrowded?
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Dr Sainsbury
I would like to get some clariﬁcation here. Speaking about Stockton, you
are actually talking about developmental disabled people, people with
developmental disability of the mind. They are going to be moved back. Many
months ago administratively and ﬁnancially there was a separation in those large
hospitals that had both mentally ill people and developmentally disabled.
Obviously things will be phased out of the isolated Morisset area part of the
hospital and some will be taken up into Stockton. It is hoped they have also
got a place at Tomaree on Nelson Bay, and there is a whole service for the
Hunter Region.
Matthew White
Tomaree used to be a holiday lodge I believe for the patients, and now it
has been closed down and turned into a virtual hospital.
Dr Sainsbury
It is part of the developmental disability service for the Hunter now.
Matthew White
The point is, if these institutions are going to be overcrowded because you
are closing down Fifth Schedule hospitals where are you going to put people
who are involuntarily admitted under the new Act if the present institutions or
the ones you have by then are all crowded?
Dr Sainsbury
There is a part of Morisset which is looking after mentally ill people, and
that is part of the Hunter Mental Health Service which now involves the Hunter
Hospital as well as the Morisset Hospital. Admissions will go to the Hunter
Hospital, and there are certain wards in the “mental health” part, if we can call
it that, of Morisset which will undertake specialized functions and take some
of the longer-term people, some of these people who may be brain damaged. It
will have a psychogeriatric type service there too. I am still not clear. There is
a category of persons, of course, the developmentally disabled person who is
also psychiatrically ill. Naturally that person if he or she were a mentally ill
person as deﬁned under the new Act he or she would be dealt with no doubt
in the psychiatric type situation.
Matthew White
I was wondering if I could ask a second question to Dr Sainsbury. In your
reply to Mr Wallach you refer to the recommendations being sent to authorized
ofﬁcers. You say the ﬁrst recommendation went to an authorized ofﬁcer in 1982
but he left in 1983 and nothing was done, and then it was sent to a second
person. ‘
Are we to presume from this that there is no sort of central co-ordination
in the Health Department when these things happen, and, if not, why was
something done by the ﬁrst authorized ofﬁcer in 1982 anyway?
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Dr Sainsbury ‘
The authorized ofﬁcer has no particular power to do anything in that
situation in any case. A recommendation was made to the Legal Services Unit
indicating that the position was such, not in 1985 but in 1984, that these people
do not need to be detained under a forensic section of the Act. The question
was asked: “What can 'be done to reverse it?” From December 1983 the new
Mental Health Act had been passed through both Houses of Parliament, it was
going to be Proclaimed every two months from then on. There were some
particular legal difﬁculties as to how a couple of people could be moved from
under the forensic part of the Act but that was put into the hands of the Legal
Section of the Department. It involves too much detail to go into individual
cases at this particular stage but there was confusion as to how it could be done,
and it was felt they were better off in any case in the particular situation in ~
which they were living. The staff knew them, they were quite happy and they '
needed the geriatric sort of care they could get at that time.
Dr Jean Lennane, Psychiatrist
I am also a unionist. We have had one union speaker already. I would like
to raise several matters, one where I have already been involved as a unionist
and that is the great problems medical staff are experiencing owing to this one
sided advocacy system. When we are running an adversarial system in the courts
normally both sides are represented. There is a prosecution side and a defence
side, but in the system as set up with the Mental Health Advocacy Service what
might be called the “prosecution” side is left really to the doctor who'is trying
therefore to act both as a medical expert witness and as the Director of
Prosecutions, and this, of course, without any legal knowledge except what we
can scrape up from just asking around the place. It seems to me unfortunate
that if we are having an adversarial system that it is adversarial, but only one
side is represented and that is not the way the rest of the system runs. I would
like a comment on that.
The other matter that I would like to comment on which has been touched
on is really the unfortunate state of the relationship between the medical and
legal profession around this area. There should be every effort made on both
sides to get together more and ﬁnd out more about each other’s ﬁelds. I
personally ﬁnd it very strange that Judge Powell’s decision, which had such far
reaching effects, appears to have been made without the basis of any expert
medical advice, and from reading it seemsto be based on a fairly complete lack
of knowledge about both dementia and psychiatric illness in general. Of course,
most serious psychiatric illness if probably organic and with another few years
of knowledge if we are excluding organic diseases we will have to exclude
deﬁnitely manic depressive illness and probably schizophrenia. I would just like
to make a plea for some more efforts on both sides to respect each other’s area
of expertise, to refrain from the unfortunate tone which I feel Mr. Wallach’s
paper showed, and try to look for ways to work together to get the best possible
services for the people who are involved. We should not be trying to compete
or build up our own empires at the expense of this particularly vulnerable group
‘in the community.
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Angela Karpin, Magistrate
I would like to comment on those observations. I was horriﬁed recently to
hear a psychiatrist suggest that psychiatrists should be legally represented at
these hearings and I think it is very important that it be clearly understood that
these hearings are not the adversarial system in full swing. These are inquiries,
and it is not the case that the opinion of the doctor is at risk. It is an inquiry
being conducted to determine whether or not the patient should be kept at the
hospital against his/her will in these circumstances. It made my blood run cold
to think how these inquiries will deteriorate if psychiatrists are going to feel
‘ they have something at stake in having their opinion upheld by the magistrate.
I think it is very important that every effort be made to reduce the adversarial
system. We live in a common law system, unfortunately lawyers think in terms
of an adversary but certainly when I conduct such inquiries I do my best to
ensure that everybody has it in mind that it is an inquiry for the interests of
the patient. I think that should be kept well in mind.
Certainly I think the Mental Health Advocacy Service has as its basic tenet
that in accordance with the instructions they receive from the client they are
there to assist the client, the patient, to leave the hospital or not to be held
there against their will if possible. Can I put this question or this proposition?
I have heard of some cases already where people are excluded from the mental
health system only to fall into our criminal justice system because, in fact, they
commit offences which then bring them before the criminal justice system. In
talking about the protection of relatives the idea that recourse would have to
be had regularly to the legal process in various ways e.g. apprehended violence,
assault charges, etc., seems to me to be contrary to the interests of the patients.
I do not know the solution to that and obviously community health based
services are the ideal but it seems to be to be very unfortunate that cases may
arise where people will be excluded from the mental health system where they
may be cared for and put into the criminal justice system which can hardly be
to their advantage in the long term.
I. Wallach
I agree that it would be a shame for people to be forced into the criminal
justice system rather than the mental health system but as I pointed out at the
beginning of my paper I think it is simply‘not true that someone who has a
mental illness and who can be shown to be violent or potentially violent is not
a mentally ill person within the meaning of the Act. If that is the case there is
something at fault in the actual admission system itself. I think that Dr
Lennane’s comments unfortunately reveal the need for the increased education
of doctors in the elements of mental health law.
In that respect I would certainly agree with her, no one is expecting doctors
to become lawyers or apparently engage in that “dehumanisation”, but if
doctors are better acquainted with the definition of who is a mentally ill person,
then I would think that someone who is potentially violent and who is mentally
ill would come within the mental health system rather than the criminal justice
system. .
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In relation to doctors actually getting their legal representatives it is a
matter for the Health Department to determine whether that occurs, but I think
it would be very unfortunate. This is the only comment I would like to make
about Dr Lennane’s comments in relation to that. It is very unfortunate that
she even uses the terms of prosecution, or defence or even adversary in relation
to these things. I think it is a great misnomer and I think she is doing a great
disservice to her own profession and the mental health system in general by
even making any comparison, no matter how passing, between the mental health
system and the criminal justice system in that regard.
Dr Durham
I deserted the microphone prematurely when I spoke before. I meant to
raise a legal question rather than discuss a case but Mr Wallach cut the legs
from under my legal question by suggesting that the account of the case which
I had submitted in writing was inaccurate. He said that on his information the
case has turned on the question of dangerousness and in particular had been
settled on the ground that insufﬁcient evidence of dangerousness had been
presented. Now, this is so far from being the case that I had a witness, the man
who was most afraid of this patient waiting to give evidence, and I was told
that I could not bring him, that it was irrelevant, the matter having been decided
on what Mr Justice Powell calls the “third leg” of the case. In other words, the ,
account that Mr Wallach got from other people’s memories is not correct and -
indeed the case was settled on the simple issue of whether he was able to care
for himself physically or not. The question of dangerousness was not allowed
to be discussed. .
Dr Peter Shea
Like any other profession, psychiatric medicine in fact swings backwards
and forwards between extremes. It is not so long since we were putting patients
into chairs and swinging them aroundin the air to try. and cure them or placing
them into cold baths and so on.
At the moment we have a swing in the Mental Health Act of 1983 towards
one particular position. I have not the faintest doubt that it will swing back
again, because the history of psychiatry is that it swings backwards and forwards
between institutionalisation and de—institutionalisation Eventually I hope we
will reach some sort of reasonable point in the middle of this swing where we
can stay for a while.
The second factor is that practice moves ahead of legislation all the time.
If you look at. the old Lunacy Act, for example, when it was ﬁrst proclaimed
there was no provision for voluntary patients in it. In fact, a lot of people came
to be admitted as voluntary patients. They had to revise the Act and put in a
provision for voluntary patients. Thereis never a time when the legislation has
ever reached a stable point where it is satisfactory.
So much as I hate to suggest this, because my recent work experience has
given me an absolute abhorrence of committees, I would suggest that what we
really need is a Standing Committee which constantly reviews both the Mental
Health Act and the application of it;
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N. Harrison
1 have been called upon to say very little at this seminar. I do not know
whether it is gratifying or not to have found that my paper and the issues raised
in it, which were particularly related to issues of persons being ﬁt to be tried
or not and defences of mental illness, raised very little comment. On that basis
I will pass the bat to my co-lawyer who has had most of the ﬂoor this seminar
and no doubt has a lot to say in summing up.
I. Wallach
I think the central thrust of what I wanted to say at this seminar is that
the advocacy service is to act for patients and people in the mental health
system in determining, what has often been raised at this seminar, the best
interests of the patient. Those best interests cannot, I believe, be determined
by one group alone or even seen as one group alone. It is often the situation
that there are conﬂicting points of view as to what may be the best for that
person in regard to treatment, and also conﬂicting points of view as to what
actually were the facts which brought a person into hospital in the ﬁrst place. I
think the exchange between Dr Durham and me as to different views of the
facts of that case illustrates that point perfectly.
As I said earlier and in relation to a number of questions, this is just not
a legal matter alone. Legal- mattersare there and are important to safeguard the
views and the rights and the wishes of the patient, but it is also a question, I
believe, of providing adequate and proper community treatment and increasing
those services, as well as retaining quite clearly the hospital system to provide
the specialised services in the crisis situations which do undoubtedly arise. I
think it is very unfortunate that some people who are professionals in caring
for the mentally ill have seen legal representation reduced into such terms as
the lawyers versus the doctors. I do not believe that assists anyone or takes
anyone any further, let alone the person I believe we all should be acting for
and in the interests of, and that of course is the person who represents our client
and our patient. '
Can I just conclude by saying this? Next week is Mental Health Week. One
of the activities which will be held during that week is going to be hosted and
will be organised by the Mental Health Advocacy Service. It is a seminar which
will be held next Tuesday night, 23rd September, and it will be held at the
YWMCA in Wentworth Avenue, Surry Hills. Anyone who is interested in the
area and wishes to come along would you please contact us in order to register
in advance and you can contact us through the Legal Aid Commission. I thank
the Chairman for allowing me to make that commercial announcement.
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